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Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "Everyone is entitled to enjoy all human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Everyone is entitled to equality before the law and the equal protection of the law without any such discrimination whether or not the enjoyment of another human right is also affected. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such discrimination. "
- "Everyone, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, has the right to security of the person and to protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual or group. "
- "Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in the determination of their rights and obligations in a suit at law and of any criminal charge against them, without prejudice or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. "
- "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. This includes the expression of identity or personhood through speech, deportment, dress, bodily characteristics, choice of name, or any other means, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, including with regard to human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, through any medium and regardless of frontiers. "
- "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including for the purposes of peaceful demonstrations, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Persons may form and have recognised, without discrimination, associations based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and associations that distribute information to or about, facilitate communication among, or advocate for the rights of, persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. "
- "Everyone lawfully within a State has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the State, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Sexual orientation and gender identity may never be invoked to limit or impede a person’s entry, egress or return to or from any State, including that person’s own State. "
- "States shall: A. review, amend and enact legislation to ensure the full enjoyment of the right to participate in public and political life and affairs, embracing all levels of government service and employment in public functions, including serving in the police and military, without discrimination on the basis of, and with full respect for, each person’s sexual orientation and gender identity. "
- "Every victim of a human rights violation, including of a violation based on sexual orientation or gender identity, has the right to effective, adequate and appropriate remedies. Measures taken for the purpose of providing reparation to, or securing adequate advancement of, persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities are integral to the right to effective remedies and redress. "
- "Racism, Zionism, occupation and foreign control constitute a challenge to human dignity and are a fundamental obstacle to the human rights of peoples. It is a duty to condemn all such practices and to work towards their abolishment."
- "Each State party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure that every individual located within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, shall have the right to enjoy all the rights and freedoms recognised in this [Charter], without distinction on the basis of race, colour sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, and without any discrimination between men and women."
- "Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of life. Each person’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo medical procedures, including sex reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal therapy, as a requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity. No status, such as marriage or parenthood, may be invoked as such to prevent the legal recognition of a person’s gender identity. No one shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity. "
- "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. These rights may not be invoked by the State to justify laws, policies or practices which deny equal protection of the law, or discriminate, on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. "
- "Each public body and relevant private body must publish the following information produced by or in relation to that body within 30 days of the information being generated or received by that body: manuals, policies, procedures or rules or similar instruments which have been prepared for, or are used by, officers of the body in discharging that body’s functions, exercising powers and handling complaints, making decisions or recommendations or providing advice to persons outside the body with respect to rights, privileges or benefits, or to obligations, penalties or other detriments, to or for which persons may be entitled. "
- "Where a person (a) wishes to make a request to an information holder; or (b) has made a request to an information holder that does not comply with the requirements of this Act, the information officer must take all necessary steps to assist the person, free of charge, to make the request in a manner that complies with this Act. "
- " Subject to subsections 6(b) and (c), a requester does not have to provide a justification or reason for requesting any information. "
- "The final results should not be published before all challenges of the preliminary results have been decided upon by the highest body of the judiciary or the constitutional court. "
- "Challenges pertaining to the preliminary results of the election within the mandate of lower level electoral bodies should be filed with the highest electoral body so as to secure a coherent and hierarchical procedure. The time-limit for filing and deciding upon such challenges should not exceed one month, so as to enable the publication of the final election results no later than this deadline (taking into account the deadline for publication of the preliminary results). "
- "All complaints pertaining to the overall final results or the declaration of election results to be partially or fully void should be filed with the highest body of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court or with the court where the highest electoral body is located. In the latter case, the ruling delivered by the court may be further appealed to the highest body of the judiciary."
- "In accordance with the procedural time limits prescribed by law for publication of the preliminary and final results and for filing and deciding upon related challenges, all complaints and appeals should be determined once and for all within a maximum of two months. "
- "In accordance with the procedural time limits prescribed by law for publication of the preliminary and final results and for filing and deciding upon related challenges, all complaints and appeals should be determined once and for all within a maximum of two months. "
- "The electoral law should clearly state the grounds upon which the election results may be partially or fully invalidated. A mere reference to the constitution should not be held as providing a sufficient basis for adjudicating such cases. Also, the law should specify the amount and type of evidence required for a review of the results. In the absence of clear and unambiguous standards of evidence, the determination of what evidence would satisfy these standards could vary on a scale that may undermine the whole process. "
- "Where a polling-station-by-polling-station resolution mechanism applies, the invalidation of voting in a particular polling station should be considered by means of an evaluation of the way the alleged irregularities or violations have affected the outcome of the election."
- "In this regard, the Committee recalls its General Comment on article 25, according to which the exercise of the rights protected by article 25 may not be suspended or excluded except on grounds which are established by law and which are objective and reasonable. The Committee notes that article 68, part 6, of the Electoral Code, gives a right to electoral commissions to refuse registering a candidate when he or she submits data that does not “correspond to reality”, including biographic data and information on income and property. "
- "In this regard, the Committee notes that article 25 of the Covenant secures to every citizen the right and the opportunity to be elected at genuine periodic elections without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2, paragraph 1, including political opinion. "
- "In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including reimbursement of the present value of the fine and any legal costs incurred by the author7, as well as compensation."
- "The Committee notes that, in the present case, the deprivation of the right to vote is coextensive with any prison sentence and recalls that, according to article 10, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, the penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation."
- "The Committee notes that the State party, whose legislation provides a blanket deprivation of the right to vote to anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment, did not provide any arguments as to how the restrictions in this particular case would meet the criterion of reasonableness as required by the Covenant. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes there has been a violation of article 25 alone and in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. "
- "The applicant was entitled under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to stand for election in fair and democratic conditions, regardless of whether ultimately he won or lost. In the present case, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 requires the Court not to ascertain merely that the election outcome as such was not prejudiced, but to verify that the applicant's individual right to stand for election was not deprived of its effectiveness and that its essence had not been impaired."
- "The Court cannot but acknowledge the seriousness of the claims made by the applicant before the domestic authorities. In particular, he complained of unlawful interference in the election process by local executive authorities, undue influence on voter choice, several instances of ballot-box stuffing, harassment of observers, irregularities in electoral rolls and obvious discrepancies in PEC protocols showing a possible failure to account for as many as thousands of “unused” blank ballots. The Court considers that these types of irregularities, if duly confirmed to have taken place, were indeed potentially capable of thwarting the democratic nature of the elections. "
- "The Court considers that the existence of a domestic system for effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights is one of the essential guarantees of free and fair elections. Such a system ensures an effective exercise of individual rights to vote and to stand for election, maintains general confidence in the State's administration of the electoral process and constitutes an important device at the State's disposal in achieving the fulfilment of its positive duty under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold democratic elections. Indeed, the State's solemn undertaking under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the individual rights guaranteed by that provision would be illusory if, throughout the electoral process, specific instances indicative of failure to ensure democratic elections are not open to challenge by individuals before a competent domestic body capable of effectively dealing with the matter."
- "The Court considers that, in order to ensure the State's compliance with its positive obligation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold free elections, the domestic courts dealing with the present case, having been called upon to decide on an arguable claim concerning election irregularities, should have reacted by taking reasonable steps to investigate the alleged irregularities without imposing unreasonable and excessively strict procedural barriers on the individual complainant. What was at stake in those proceedings was not only the alleged infringement of the applicant's individual rights but also, on a more general level, the State's compliance with its positive duty to hold free and fair elections. Therefore, even assuming that the courts in the present case might have been unable to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant, the material put before them was nevertheless strong enough to require them to take additional steps to obtain more information and verify the accuracy of the applicant's allegations which cast doubt on the free and fair character of the elections in his constituency."
- "The Court acknowledges that, owing to the complexity of the electoral process and associated time-restraints necessitating streamlining of various election-related procedures, the relevant domestic authorities may be required to examine election-related appeals within comparatively short time-limits in order to avoid retarding the electoral process. For the same practical reasons, the States may find it inexpedient to require these authorities to abide by a set of very strict procedural safeguards or to deliver very detailed decisions. Nevertheless, these considerations may not serve to undermine the effectiveness of the appeal procedure, and it must be ensured that a genuine effort is made to address the substance of arguable individual complaints concerning electoral irregularities and that the relevant decisions are sufficiently reasoned. In the present case, however, the conduct of the electoral commissions and courts and their respective decisions revealed an appearance of lack of any genuine concern for the protection of the applicant's right to stand for election."
- "The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations” and Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in the sphere of elections (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV). It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. In particular, it has to satisfy itself, among other things, that the conditions in which individual rights are exercised in the course of the electoral process do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52, and Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV). Such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62)."
- "In the case of Podkolzina v. Latvia, the Court stated that the right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55, ECHR 2008‑...)."
- "The obligation to pay relates to the amount by which the Constitutional Council has found the ceiling to have been exceeded. This would appear to show that it is in the nature of a payment to the community of the sum of which the candidate in question improperly took advantage to seek the votes of his fellow citizens and that it too forms part of the measures designed to ensure the proper conduct of parliamentary elections and, in particular, equality of the candidates. Furthermore, apart from the fact that the amount payable is neither determined according to a fixed scale nor set in advance, several features differentiate this obligation to pay from criminal fines in the strict sense: no entry is made in the criminal record, the rule that consecutive sentences are not imposed in respect of multiple offences does not apply, and imprisonment is not available to sanction failure to pay. In view of its nature, the obligation to pay the Treasury a sum equal to the amount of the excess cannot be construed as a fine."
- "The Court reiterates, having regard to the parties’ submissions which are summarised above, in paragraphs 60 et seq. and 72 et seq., that “the scope of the Contracting States’ obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint; ... the remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or remedying the impugned state of affairs, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred” (see Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 77568/01, 178/02 and 505/02, § 74, 11 June 2009). The Court also reiterates that “although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so” (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000‑XI). "
- "The Court is mindful of the stance taken by the Venice Commission that “equality of opportunity” shall be guaranteed to all parties and candidates alike entailing a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to the election campaign and coverage by the media (see paragraph 51 above). That being said, the Court observes that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was not conceived as a code on electoral matters, designed to regulate all aspects of the electoral process. There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 103, ECHR 2006‑IV). The States “enjoy considerable latitude to establish rules within their constitutional order governing parliamentary elections and the composition of the parliament, and ... the relevant criteria may vary according to the historical and political factors peculiar to each State” (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004‑V). "
- "While this margin of appreciation is wide, it is certainly not all-embracing: the rules governing the electoral system “should not be such as to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country and, in particular, in the choice of the legislature, a right guaranteed by both the Convention and the Constitutions of all Contracting States” (ibid.). It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the restrictions imposed do not thwart the free expression of the opinion of the people. "
- "According to the presentation on the opinions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding specific situations related to the authenticity of the elections, the purpose is to achieve general conditions so that the electoral process offers every group that participates an equal opportunity. "
- "The Commission considers that the act of ratifying the American Convention presupposes acceptance of the obligation of not only respecting the observance of rights and freedoms recognized in it, but also guaranteeing their existence and the exercise of all of them. It is these elements of political rights presented in item 5 of this document that the State commits itself not only to respect but “guarantee their full and free exercise,” according to Article 1.1 of the Convention. It must be pointed out that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Decision of July 29, 1988, in the case of Velásquez Rodríguez, has stated that Article 1.1 of the Convention: Article 1 (1) is essential in determining whether a violation of the human rights recognized by the Convention can be imputed to a State Party. In effect, that article charges the States Parties with the fundamental duty to respect and guarantee the rights recognized in the Convention. Any impairment of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention. "
- "According to the Court, “this obligation implies the duty of the State party to organize all the state apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which the exercise of public power is manifested, in such a manner that they are able to legally insure the free and full exercise of human rights.” That is the basis of the obligation stipulated in Article 2 of the Convention for the adoption of measures of internal law to make those rights and liberties effective. Therefore, this carries with it the obligation of the state party to adapt its internal legislation when it suffers defects that prevent or hinder the full observance of the rights recognized by the Convention and, in this specific case, the rights protected by Article 23. "
- "Although the Committee considers that, even if in some circumstances denial of access to State-owned or State-controlled distribution services may amount to an interference with rights protected by article 19, in the present case, the author has not provided sufficient information that would permit the Committee to evaluate the extent of the interference or to determine whether the denial of such access is discriminatory. The Committee further notes that in any event, even if the newspaper in question was not included in the “Belpochta” subscription list and was not delivered to his home address by mail, the author was able to obtain it by other means. "
- "The Court considers that, irrespective of whether or not the request was made outside the legal time frame for the registration of candidacies submitted by political parties, the decision of IFE not to accept the alleged victim’s request constituted, for the effects of this Court’s competence, an act enforcing the law, since this negative was based, first, on the provisions of Article 177 of the COFIPE concerning the legal time frames for the registration of candidacies and, second, on the provisions of Article 175 of COFIPE, concerning candidacies by means of political parties, and this authority had indicated the legal impossibility of accepting Mr. Castañeda Gutman’s request. This decision, based on the constitutional and legal provisions that regulate the matter, issued by the competent administrative authority hat ruled on the legal issue filed before it, with the specific and concrete effect of not allowing the registration of the candidacy, was the act enforcing the law, and was even considered as such by the domestic courts. "
- "Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in general terms, the obligation of the States to guarantee an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate fundamental rights. When interpreting the text of Article 25 of the Convention, the Court has stated that the State’s obligation to provide a judicial remedy is not limited to the mere existence of the courts or the formal procedures, or even to the possibility of resorting to the courts, but that the remedies must be effective; in other words, they must provide the person with the real possibility of filing a remedy, in the terms of that provision. The existence of this guarantee “constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but also of the rule of law in a democratic society pursuant to the Convention.” Thus, in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, the States undertake to develop the possibilities of the judicial remedy. "
- "The State’s general obligation to adapt its domestic laws to the provisions of the Convention in order to guarantee the rights it embodies, which is established in Article 2, includes issuing norms and developing practices that lead to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Convention, as well as adopting measures to eliminate norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees established therein. "
- "The Court observes that, in order to prove the alleged violation of Article 25 of the Convention, both the Commission and the representatives indicated the lack of a simple, prompt and effective remedy for the alleged victim to claim the protection of his constitutional rights. In this regard, the Court considers, as do the Commission and the State, that the application for amparo filed by the alleged victim was not the appropriate remedy in this case, since it was inadmissible in relation to electoral matters. "
- "The Court finds that it is not inherently incompatible with the Convention that a State limits the application for amparo to specific matters, provided that it offers another remedy of a similar nature and equal scope for those rights that cannot be heard by the courts using the amparo proceeding. This is particularly relevant as regards political rights, which are human rights of such importance that the American Convention prohibits their suspension, and also of the judicial rights that are essential to protect them (infra para. 140). "
- "Despite the above, the Court considers it pertinent to refer to the Inter-American Commission’s argument that, over and above the fact that the application for amparo was not the appropriate remedy, because electoral matters fell outside its sphere of competence, “effectiveness implies that the judicial body has assessed the merits of the complaint.” In this regard, the Court has established that “the competent authority’s examination of a judicial remedy […] cannot be limited to a mere formality, but must examine the reasons invoked by the complainant and specifically express an opinion on them, according to the parameters established by the American Convention. In other words, it is a minimum guarantee for anyone who files a remedy that the grounds for the ruling deciding it are stated; otherwise the ruling will violate the guarantee of due process. "
- "For the Court, the requirement that the decision should be founded is not the same as an analysis of the merits of the matter, since this examination is not essential to determine the effectiveness of the remedy. The existence and application of conditions for the admissibility of a remedy is compatible with the American Convention, and the effectiveness of the remedy implies that, when these conditions are complied with, the judicial organ may assess its merits. "
- "The Court considers that the meaning of the protection granted by Article 25 of the Convention is the real possibility of access to a judicial remedy so that the competent authority, with jurisdiction to issue a binding decision, determines whether there has been a violation of a right claimed by the person filing the action, and that the remedy is useful to restitute to the interested party the enjoyment of his right and to repair it, if it finds there has been a violation. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to establish this judicial guarantee if the plaintiffs were obliged to know beforehand whether the judicial organ would consider that their situation was protected by a specific right. "