3619 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "The obligation of political figures, including candidates, to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than ordinary persons should be clearly reaffirmed during elections. "
- "A party or candidate which has been illegally defamed or suffered another illegal injury by a statement in the media during an election period should be entitled to a rapid correction of that statement or have the right to seek redress in a court of law. "
- "It should be illegal for the media to discriminate, on the basis of political opinion or other recognised grounds, in the allocation of and charging for paid political advertisements, where these are permitted by law. "
- "Oversight of any rules relating to the media and elections should be vested in an independent administrative body which should address any complaints promptly. The decisions of this body should be subject to judicial review. "
- "The electoral law should specify whether the entities vested with the power to invalidate the election results can take action without being presented with a formal complaint and whether their decisions should be made on a polling-station-by-polling-station basis. It should be clear from the law whether a general invalidation mechanism applies or a matters and the admissibility of complaints and appeals."
- "Both the preliminary and the final results should be subject to challenges. Therefore the electoral law should differentiate between the procedures, deadlines and time-limits applicable to each phase."
- "Where lower level electoral bodies are mandated to publish the preliminary results of the election, they should not be entitled to declare the results void but should be able to make non-binding recommendations to that purpose to the highest electoral body."
- "The final results should not be published before all challenges of the preliminary results have been decided upon by the highest body of the judiciary or the constitutional court. "
- "Challenges pertaining to the preliminary results of the election within the mandate of lower level electoral bodies should be filed with the highest electoral body so as to secure a coherent and hierarchical procedure. The time-limit for filing and deciding upon such challenges should not exceed one month, so as to enable the publication of the final election results no later than this deadline (taking into account the deadline for publication of the preliminary results). "
- "All complaints pertaining to the overall final results or the declaration of election results to be partially or fully void should be filed with the highest body of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court or with the court where the highest electoral body is located. In the latter case, the ruling delivered by the court may be further appealed to the highest body of the judiciary."
- "In accordance with the procedural time limits prescribed by law for publication of the preliminary and final results and for filing and deciding upon related challenges, all complaints and appeals should be determined once and for all within a maximum of two months. "
- "In accordance with the procedural time limits prescribed by law for publication of the preliminary and final results and for filing and deciding upon related challenges, all complaints and appeals should be determined once and for all within a maximum of two months. "
- "The electoral law should clearly state the grounds upon which the election results may be partially or fully invalidated. A mere reference to the constitution should not be held as providing a sufficient basis for adjudicating such cases. Also, the law should specify the amount and type of evidence required for a review of the results. In the absence of clear and unambiguous standards of evidence, the determination of what evidence would satisfy these standards could vary on a scale that may undermine the whole process. "
- "Where a polling-station-by-polling-station resolution mechanism applies, the invalidation of voting in a particular polling station should be considered by means of an evaluation of the way the alleged irregularities or violations have affected the outcome of the election."
- "In this regard, the Committee recalls its General Comment on article 25, according to which the exercise of the rights protected by article 25 may not be suspended or excluded except on grounds which are established by law and which are objective and reasonable. The Committee notes that article 68, part 6, of the Electoral Code, gives a right to electoral commissions to refuse registering a candidate when he or she submits data that does not “correspond to reality”, including biographic data and information on income and property. "
- "In this regard, the Committee notes that article 25 of the Covenant secures to every citizen the right and the opportunity to be elected at genuine periodic elections without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2, paragraph 1, including political opinion. "
- "The second issue is, therefore, whether in the present case such obstacles are justified under article 19, paragraph 3 [Freedom of Opinion and Expression], of the Covenant, which allows certain restrictions but only as provided by law and necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; and (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. The right to freedom of expression is of paramount importance, and any restrictions to the exercise of this right must meet a strict test of justification. "
- " In the present case, the Committee must consider whether the restrictions imposed on the author’s right to freedom of assembly were justified under any of the criteria set out in article 21. The Committee notes the State party’s assertion that the restrictions were in accordance with the law. However, the State party has not demonstrated to the Committee’s satisfaction that the impeding of the two pickets in question was necessary for the purpose of protecting the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, the State party never refuted the author’s claim that no event actually occurred at Gorky Square on 7 October 2007, and that the city administration’s claim of a competing Teachers’ Day event was in fact a mere pretext given in order to reject the author’s request. In these circumstances, the Committee concludes that in the present case the State party has violated the author’s right under article 21 of the Covenant. "
- "The Committee has to consider whether the restrictions imposed on the author's right to freedom of expression are justified under any of the criteria set out in article 19, paragraph 3. The Committee observes that, in the present case, the State party has merely argued that the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, may be subject to limitations as provided for by law (article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant and article 32 of the Belarus Constitution). "
- "Regarding the author’s claim under article 21 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that the State party has failed to demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on the author were necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
- "In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including reimbursement of the present value of the fine and any legal costs incurred by the author7, as well as compensation."
- "The Committee observes that the right to freedom of association relates not only to the right to form an association, but also guarantees the right of such an association freely to carry out its statutory activities. The protection afforded by article 22 extends to all activities of an association, and the denial of state registration of an association must satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of that provision."
- "The Committee observes that, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 2, any restriction on the right to freedom of association must cumulatively meet the following conditions: (a) it must be provided by law; (b) may only be imposed for one of the purposes set out in paragraph 2; and (c) must be „necessary in a democratic society‟ for achieving one of these purposes. The reference to „democratic society‟ in the context of article 22 indicates, in the Committee‟s opinion, that the existence and operation of associations, including those which peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favourably viewed by the government or the majority of the population, is a cornerstone of a democratic society."
- "The Committee considers that even if these and other restrictions were precise and predictable and were indeed prescribed by law, the State party has not advanced any argument as to why such restrictions would be necessary, for purposes of article 22, paragraph 2, to condition the registration of an association on a limitation of a scope of its human rights activities to the undefined issues not covered by state organs or on the existence of regional branches of „Democracy and Rights‟."
- "As to the technical requirements, the Committee notes that the parties disagree over the interpretation of domestic law and the State party‟s failure to advance arguments as to which of the numerous „defects‟ in the association‟s application materials triggers the application of the restrictions spelled out in article 22, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Even if the application materials of „Democracy and Rights‟ did not fully comply with the requirements of domestic law, the reaction of the State party‟s authorities in denying the registration of the association was disproportionate."
- "The Committee observes that article 19 allows restrictions only as provided by law and necessary (a) for respect of the rights and reputation of others; and (b) for the protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. It recalls that the right to freedom of expression is of paramount importance in any society, and any restrictions to its exercise must meet a strict test of justification."
- "The Committee notes that, in the present case, the deprivation of the right to vote is coextensive with any prison sentence and recalls that, according to article 10, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, the penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation."
- "The Committee notes that the State party, whose legislation provides a blanket deprivation of the right to vote to anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment, did not provide any arguments as to how the restrictions in this particular case would meet the criterion of reasonableness as required by the Covenant. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes there has been a violation of article 25 alone and in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. "
- "The applicant was entitled under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to stand for election in fair and democratic conditions, regardless of whether ultimately he won or lost. In the present case, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 requires the Court not to ascertain merely that the election outcome as such was not prejudiced, but to verify that the applicant's individual right to stand for election was not deprived of its effectiveness and that its essence had not been impaired."
- "The Court cannot but acknowledge the seriousness of the claims made by the applicant before the domestic authorities. In particular, he complained of unlawful interference in the election process by local executive authorities, undue influence on voter choice, several instances of ballot-box stuffing, harassment of observers, irregularities in electoral rolls and obvious discrepancies in PEC protocols showing a possible failure to account for as many as thousands of “unused” blank ballots. The Court considers that these types of irregularities, if duly confirmed to have taken place, were indeed potentially capable of thwarting the democratic nature of the elections. "
- "The Court considers that the existence of a domestic system for effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights is one of the essential guarantees of free and fair elections. Such a system ensures an effective exercise of individual rights to vote and to stand for election, maintains general confidence in the State's administration of the electoral process and constitutes an important device at the State's disposal in achieving the fulfilment of its positive duty under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold democratic elections. Indeed, the State's solemn undertaking under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the individual rights guaranteed by that provision would be illusory if, throughout the electoral process, specific instances indicative of failure to ensure democratic elections are not open to challenge by individuals before a competent domestic body capable of effectively dealing with the matter."
- "The Court considers that, in order to ensure the State's compliance with its positive obligation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold free elections, the domestic courts dealing with the present case, having been called upon to decide on an arguable claim concerning election irregularities, should have reacted by taking reasonable steps to investigate the alleged irregularities without imposing unreasonable and excessively strict procedural barriers on the individual complainant. What was at stake in those proceedings was not only the alleged infringement of the applicant's individual rights but also, on a more general level, the State's compliance with its positive duty to hold free and fair elections. Therefore, even assuming that the courts in the present case might have been unable to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant, the material put before them was nevertheless strong enough to require them to take additional steps to obtain more information and verify the accuracy of the applicant's allegations which cast doubt on the free and fair character of the elections in his constituency."
- "The Court acknowledges that, owing to the complexity of the electoral process and associated time-restraints necessitating streamlining of various election-related procedures, the relevant domestic authorities may be required to examine election-related appeals within comparatively short time-limits in order to avoid retarding the electoral process. For the same practical reasons, the States may find it inexpedient to require these authorities to abide by a set of very strict procedural safeguards or to deliver very detailed decisions. Nevertheless, these considerations may not serve to undermine the effectiveness of the appeal procedure, and it must be ensured that a genuine effort is made to address the substance of arguable individual complaints concerning electoral irregularities and that the relevant decisions are sufficiently reasoned. In the present case, however, the conduct of the electoral commissions and courts and their respective decisions revealed an appearance of lack of any genuine concern for the protection of the applicant's right to stand for election."
- "The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations” and Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in the sphere of elections (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV). It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. In particular, it has to satisfy itself, among other things, that the conditions in which individual rights are exercised in the course of the electoral process do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52, and Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV). Such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62)."
- "In the case of Podkolzina v. Latvia, the Court stated that the right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55, ECHR 2008‑...)."
- "The obligation to pay relates to the amount by which the Constitutional Council has found the ceiling to have been exceeded. This would appear to show that it is in the nature of a payment to the community of the sum of which the candidate in question improperly took advantage to seek the votes of his fellow citizens and that it too forms part of the measures designed to ensure the proper conduct of parliamentary elections and, in particular, equality of the candidates. Furthermore, apart from the fact that the amount payable is neither determined according to a fixed scale nor set in advance, several features differentiate this obligation to pay from criminal fines in the strict sense: no entry is made in the criminal record, the rule that consecutive sentences are not imposed in respect of multiple offences does not apply, and imprisonment is not available to sanction failure to pay. In view of its nature, the obligation to pay the Treasury a sum equal to the amount of the excess cannot be construed as a fine."
- "The Court reiterates, having regard to the parties’ submissions which are summarised above, in paragraphs 60 et seq. and 72 et seq., that “the scope of the Contracting States’ obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint; ... the remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or remedying the impugned state of affairs, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred” (see Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 77568/01, 178/02 and 505/02, § 74, 11 June 2009). The Court also reiterates that “although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so” (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000‑XI). "
- "The Court is mindful of the stance taken by the Venice Commission that “equality of opportunity” shall be guaranteed to all parties and candidates alike entailing a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to the election campaign and coverage by the media (see paragraph 51 above). That being said, the Court observes that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was not conceived as a code on electoral matters, designed to regulate all aspects of the electoral process. There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 103, ECHR 2006‑IV). The States “enjoy considerable latitude to establish rules within their constitutional order governing parliamentary elections and the composition of the parliament, and ... the relevant criteria may vary according to the historical and political factors peculiar to each State” (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004‑V). "
- "While this margin of appreciation is wide, it is certainly not all-embracing: the rules governing the electoral system “should not be such as to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country and, in particular, in the choice of the legislature, a right guaranteed by both the Convention and the Constitutions of all Contracting States” (ibid.). It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the restrictions imposed do not thwart the free expression of the opinion of the people. "
- "The Court will now turn to the substantive positive obligations of the State in the context of media coverage of elections. The Court reiterates that there can be no democracy without pluralism (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, §§ 89 et seq., 17 February 2004), which cannot be attained without the adoption of certain positive measures. In the field of audio-visual broadcasting the Court has stated that where a State “decide[s] to create a public broadcasting system, ... domestic law and practice must guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic service” (see Manole and Others, cited above, §§ 100-01). In the context of elections the duty of the State to adopt some positive measures to secure pluralism of views has also been recognised by the Court (see, for example, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54; see also, mutatis mutandis, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, § 38, and Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, nos. 55066/00 and 55638/00, §§ 71-72, 11 January 2007). "
- "The Court has already admitted that political pluralism can be regarded as a “pressing social need” legitimising some forms of interference with the freedom of expression (see Bowman, cited above). At the same time the Court has repeatedly warned against prior restraints on free speech (see, for example, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, § 51, Series A no. 217), and stressed that in the sphere of political debate wide limits of criticism are acceptable (see Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, §§ 41 and 42). The question is what sort of interference with journalistic freedom would be appropriate in the circumstances in order to protect the applicants’ rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. "
- "According to the presentation on the opinions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding specific situations related to the authenticity of the elections, the purpose is to achieve general conditions so that the electoral process offers every group that participates an equal opportunity. "
- "In its 1986-1987 Annual Report, also referring to Chile and the background analyzed in its 1985 Report, it was pointed out that: Also in light of previous experiences and in accordance with human rights norms, the Commission must point out that the exercise of the right to vote must be included in a context favoring the authenticity of elections in which the free expression of the will of the voters is ensured, as Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights states."
- "The Commission considers that the act of ratifying the American Convention presupposes acceptance of the obligation of not only respecting the observance of rights and freedoms recognized in it, but also guaranteeing their existence and the exercise of all of them. It is these elements of political rights presented in item 5 of this document that the State commits itself not only to respect but “guarantee their full and free exercise,” according to Article 1.1 of the Convention. It must be pointed out that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Decision of July 29, 1988, in the case of Velásquez Rodríguez, has stated that Article 1.1 of the Convention: Article 1 (1) is essential in determining whether a violation of the human rights recognized by the Convention can be imputed to a State Party. In effect, that article charges the States Parties with the fundamental duty to respect and guarantee the rights recognized in the Convention. Any impairment of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention. "
- "According to the Court, “this obligation implies the duty of the State party to organize all the state apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which the exercise of public power is manifested, in such a manner that they are able to legally insure the free and full exercise of human rights.” That is the basis of the obligation stipulated in Article 2 of the Convention for the adoption of measures of internal law to make those rights and liberties effective. Therefore, this carries with it the obligation of the state party to adapt its internal legislation when it suffers defects that prevent or hinder the full observance of the rights recognized by the Convention and, in this specific case, the rights protected by Article 23. "
- "Although the Committee considers that, even if in some circumstances denial of access to State-owned or State-controlled distribution services may amount to an interference with rights protected by article 19, in the present case, the author has not provided sufficient information that would permit the Committee to evaluate the extent of the interference or to determine whether the denial of such access is discriminatory. The Committee further notes that in any event, even if the newspaper in question was not included in the “Belpochta” subscription list and was not delivered to his home address by mail, the author was able to obtain it by other means. "
- "The Court considers that, irrespective of whether or not the request was made outside the legal time frame for the registration of candidacies submitted by political parties, the decision of IFE not to accept the alleged victim’s request constituted, for the effects of this Court’s competence, an act enforcing the law, since this negative was based, first, on the provisions of Article 177 of the COFIPE concerning the legal time frames for the registration of candidacies and, second, on the provisions of Article 175 of COFIPE, concerning candidacies by means of political parties, and this authority had indicated the legal impossibility of accepting Mr. Castañeda Gutman’s request. This decision, based on the constitutional and legal provisions that regulate the matter, issued by the competent administrative authority hat ruled on the legal issue filed before it, with the specific and concrete effect of not allowing the registration of the candidacy, was the act enforcing the law, and was even considered as such by the domestic courts. "
- "The submission of a request for registration of a candidacy is not a remedy, because its purpose is not to establish whether there has been a violation of the human rights established in the American Convention and, if applicable, provide the necessary remedy. "
- "Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in general terms, the obligation of the States to guarantee an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate fundamental rights. When interpreting the text of Article 25 of the Convention, the Court has stated that the State’s obligation to provide a judicial remedy is not limited to the mere existence of the courts or the formal procedures, or even to the possibility of resorting to the courts, but that the remedies must be effective; in other words, they must provide the person with the real possibility of filing a remedy, in the terms of that provision. The existence of this guarantee “constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but also of the rule of law in a democratic society pursuant to the Convention.” Thus, in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, the States undertake to develop the possibilities of the judicial remedy. "
- "The State’s general obligation to adapt its domestic laws to the provisions of the Convention in order to guarantee the rights it embodies, which is established in Article 2, includes issuing norms and developing practices that lead to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Convention, as well as adopting measures to eliminate norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees established therein. "