367 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "The Court observes that, in comparative electoral law, the regulation of the right to be elected, as regards the registration of the candidacies, may be executed in two ways: by the system of registration of candidates exclusively by the political parties, or by the system of registration of candidacies by the political parties, together with the possibility of registering independent candidacies. In the region, there is a certain balance between the States that have establishes the system of registration exclusively by parties and those that also allow independent candidacies. "
- "Neither of the two systems: exclusive nomination by political parties or the one that allows independent candidacies is, in itself, more or less restrictive than the other in terms of regulating the right to be elected embodied in Article 23 of the Convention. The Court considers that it is not possible to make an abstract assessment of whether the system that allows independent candidacies is a less restrictive alternative for regulating the right to be elected than the other that does not allow them. This will depend on diverse circumstances, especially on how the abovementioned aspects of the independent candidacies are regulated or on the regulation of the candidacies presented by parties. "
- "Independent candidacies can be regulated to facilitate and expand access to the right to be elected, but at times the requirements for registering independent candidacies can be greater than those established for the nomination of a candidate by a political party. The mere fact that independent candidacies are allowed does not mean that this is the least restrictive way to regulate the right to be elected. The essential point is that whichever of the two systems is chosen, it should make accessible and guarantee the right and the opportunity to be elected established in the Convention, under equal conditions. "
- "Regarding whether the measure was adapted to achieving the legitimate objective sought, based on the above the Court finds that, in the instant case, the exclusivity of nomination by political parties to elected office at the federal level is an appropriate measure to produce the legitimate result sought of organizing the electoral processes efficiently in order to hold genuine periodic elections, by universal and equal suffrage and by secret vote that guarantee the free expression of the will of the voters, as established by the American Convention. "
- "Lastly, the Court considers that both systems, one built on the exclusive basis of political parties, and the other that also allows independent candidacies can be compatible with the Convention and, therefore, the decision on which system to choose is subject to the political decision made by the State, in accordance with its constitutional norms. The Court is aware that there is a profound crisis as regards the political parties, the legislatures and those who conduct public affairs in the region, which calls for a thorough and thoughtful debate on political participation and representation, transparency, and the rapprochement of the institutions to the people, in brief, on strengthening and improving democracy. Civil society and the State have the fundamental responsibility, which cannot be waived, to carry out this discussion and make proposals to reverse the situation. In this regard, the States must assess the measures that will strengthen political rights and democracy according to their particular historical and political evolution, and independent candidacies may be one among many of these mechanisms. "
- "Universal franchise is a key element of modern democracies. It is important that the right to vote and the process of voter registration are not unreasonably restricted on the basis of race, gender, religion, ethnic origin, past or present political affiliation, language, literacy, property or registration fees. However, the right to vote, may be subject to a number of reasonable conditions, the most usual being age, citizenship and residency. Furthermore, there might be provisions for clauses suspending political rights due to lawful detention, criminal convictions or mental incapacity. "
- "As with the right to vote, the right to stand for elections is universal, and can not be limited for reasons of e.g. race, gender, language, religion, ethnic origin, political affiliation, or economic status. Internationally accepted restrictions may include a minimum age that is higher than the voting age, citizenship and a residency requirement for a certain period of time before elections. Furthermore, the obligation to collect a specific number of signatures or to pay a small deposit are considered as being generally compatible with the universal right to stand for elections. There might also be provisions for clauses suspending political rights (lawful detention, mental incapacity etc.). "
- "Following the same arguments as for granting non-citizens the right to vote in local elections, it is recommended accordingly that the right to stand for local election shall be granted to long-standing foreign residents, if possible. "
- "While residency requirements are not incompatible a priori with the principal of universal suffrage, it is not acceptable to limit the right to be elected to only those citizens who have resided in a country, region or constituency for an extensively long period of time. "
- "It is not uncommon that due to a criminal conviction for a serious offence, individuals are deprived of the right to stand for election. However, it can be regarded as problematic if the passive right of suffrage is denied on the basis of any conviction, regardless of the nature of the underlying offence. "
- "The obligation to collect a specific number of signatures is not uncommon by international standards. However, it is generally agreed that signature requirements should not be too high. "
- "With signature requirements, the checking of signatures is necessary. The process is not only time consuming, but also open to abuse. This is especially true if, by law, only a sample of the signatures is checked at random and in an inconsistent manner. "
- "It is important that minor formal errors do not automatically result in the signature lists being declared invalid. Provisions should be made to allow for the correction of any formal or minor errors in the nomination and registration process. "
- "De-registration of candidates is a particular problem. While the initial registration of candidates may be positively assessed, the electoral commission is often allowed to de-register candidates before the election, for example, if they seriously violate the electoral law. However, inconsistent and inappropriate last-minute de-registration of candidates, often on minor technical grounds, should be avoided. Care should be taken that provisions allowing for the de-registration of candidates are not abused for political purposes. "
- "Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal being voted on. This entails a neutral attitude by administrative authorities, in particular with regard to: i. the referendum campaign; ii. coverage by the media, in particular by the publicly owned media; iii. public funding of campaign and its actors; iv. billposting and advertising; v. the right to demonstrate on public thoroughfares. "
- "The principle of equality of opportunity can, in certain cases, lead to a limitation of spending by political parties and other parties involved in the referendum debate, especially on advertising. "
- "[P]olling stations must include representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed by the latter or by other groups that have taken a stand on the issue put to the vote must be permitted during voting and counting. "
- "The general rules on the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns must be applied to both public and private funding. "
- "The time-limit for collecting signatures (particularly the day on which the time-limit starts to run and the last day of the time-limit) must be clearly specified, as well as the number of signatures to be collected. "
- "Everyone (regardless of whether he or she enjoys political rights) must be entitled to collect signatures. "
- "If authorisation is required in order to gather signatures for popular initiatives or requests for a referendum on public thoroughfares, such authorisation may be refused only in specific cases provided for by law, on the basis of overriding public interest and in accordance with the principle of equality. "
- "All signatures must be checked. In order to facilitate checking, lists of signatures should preferably contain the names of electors registered in the same municipality. "
- "In order to avoid having to declare a vote totally invalid, an authority must have the power, prior to the vote, to correct faulty drafting, for example: i. when the question is obscure, misleading or suggestive; ii. when rules on procedural or substantive validity have been violated; in this event, partial invalidity may be declared if the remaining text is coherent; subdivision may be envisaged to correct a lack of substantive unity. "
- "The European Court of Human Rights held that the restriction of the right to vote to citizens resident in national territory could be justified on the following grounds: “(1) the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or continuously concerned with, and has less knowledge of, a country’s day-to-day problems; (2) the impracticality and sometimes undesirability (in some cases impossibility) of parliamentary candidates presenting the different electoral issues to citizens living abroad so as to secure the free expression of opinion; (3) the influence of resident citizens on the selection of candidates and on the formulation of their electoral programmes; and (4) the correlation between one’s right to vote in parliamentary elections and being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected”. "
- "The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters produced by the Venice Commission provides simply that “the right to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad”, without making it a requirement to grant such a right. "
- "Voting from abroad is subject to a number of practical conditions, beginning with registration on the electoral roll. Generally, a prior application is required from the citizen abroad (“active” registration system). In these cases, it is necessary to determine the deadline for citizens to register, the form required for this type of declaration and the authority to which these applications must be made. "
- "It is perfectly legitimate to require voters living abroad to register to be able to vote, even if registration is automatic for residents. "
- "The obligation to vote in an embassy or consulate may in practice severely restrict the right to vote of citizens living abroad. This restriction may be justified on the grounds that the other means of voting (postal vote, proxy voting, e-voting) are not always reliable. "
- "As to parliamentary elections, the Court notes that the rights safeguarded by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute but subject to restrictions. The Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation to make the right to vote subject to conditions, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 52, and Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I). "
- "The Court considers that the residence requirement which prompted the application is justified on account of the following factors: firstly, the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country. "
- "It is possible that the applicant has not severed ties with his country of origin and that some of the factors indicated above are therefore inapplicable to this case. However, the law cannot take account of every individual case but must lay down a general rule. Furthermore, the applicant cannot argue that he is affected by the acts of political institutions to the same extent as resident citizens. Thus the applicant’s situation is different from that of a resident citizen, and that justifies the residence requirement. "
- "The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 64). Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims”, the Contracting States can justify a restriction by reference to any aim which is compatible with the principle of the rule of law and with the general objectives of the Convention (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR 2006-IV; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 64). "
- "The Court has previously implied that the ease with which an applicant can acquire the citizenship of his State of residence, and thus exercise his right to vote in that country, may be relevant to the proportionality of a residence requirement in his State of origin (see Doyle, cited above). The possibility of acquiring a new citizenship is not, however, decisive given that the acquisition of such citizenship may have adverse consequences in other areas of one’s life and that an applicant’s interest in casting his vote in the State to which he feels most closely connected must also be given due weight. "
- "The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a characteristic principle of an effective political democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has held that it also implies individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election (ibid., § 51). It has also held that the standards to be applied for establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must be considered to be less stringent than those applied under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR 2006-IV). "
- "The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are free to rely on an aim not contained in such a list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case (see Ždanoka, cited above). Nevertheless, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions to which the right to vote and the right to stand for election are made subject do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they meet the requirements of lawfulness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 162, ECHR 2010, and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). "
- "As regards restrictions on expatriate voting rights based on the criterion of residence, the Convention institutions have accepted in the past that these might be justified by several factors: firstly, the presumption that non-resident citizens are less directly or less continually concerned with their country’s day-to-day problems and have less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that non-resident citizens have less influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country (see Hilbe, cited above; see also X and Association Y v. Italy, no. 8987/80, Commission decision of 6 May 1981, Decisions and Reports (DR) 24, p. 192, and Polacco and Garofalo v. Italy, no. 23450/94, Commission decision of 15 September 1997, DR 90-A, p. 5). More recently, the Court has taken the view that having to satisfy a residence or length-of-residence requirement in order to have or exercise the right to vote in elections is not, in principle, an arbitrary restriction of the right to vote and is therefore not incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Doyle v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30158/06, 6 February 2007). "
- "The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 implies subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. As important as those rights are, they are not, however, absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them out in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for “implied limitations” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52). In their internal legal orders the Contracting States may make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. "
- "As to the condition of residence in relation to the right to stand for elections, as such, the Court has never expressed its opinion on this point. However, in relation to the separate right to vote, the Court has held that it was not per se an unreasonable or arbitrary requirement (see Hilbe v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999-VI). The Court considers that a residence requirement for voting may be justified on the following grounds: (1) the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or continuously concerned with, and has less knowledge of, a country’s day-to-day problems; (2) the impracticality and sometimes undesirability (in some cases impossibility) of parliamentary candidates presenting the different electoral issues to citizens living abroad so as to secure the free expression of opinion; (3) the influence of resident citizens on the selection of candidates and on the formulation of their electoral programmes; and (4) the correlation between one’s right to vote in parliamentary elections and being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected (see Polacco and Garofalo v. Italy, no. 23450/94, Commission decision of 15 September 1997, Decisions and Reports 90-A, referring to previous Commission case-law). "
- "The Court accepts that stricter requirements may be imposed on the eligibility to stand for election to parliament, as distinguished from voting eligibility. Hence the Court would not preclude outright a five-year continuous residency requirement for potential parliamentary candidates. Arguably, this requirement may be deemed appropriate to enable such persons to acquire sufficient knowledge of the issues associated with the national parliament’s tasks. "
- "In that connection, the Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the Convention requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not just theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, for example, Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15-16, § 33; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 18-19, § 33; and Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic system, would be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions. "
- "The Committee considers that the evaluation of any restrictions must be effected on a case-by-case basis, having regard in particular to the purpose of such restrictions and the principle of proportionality. "
- "The Court also reiterates that, while the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote and to stand for election, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate or arbitrary (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113; Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV; and Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 109 (iii), 8 July 2008). "
- "The Court recalls that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 implies subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. As important as those rights are, they are not, however, absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations. In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. The Court considers that the restrictions imposed on the applicants’ right to contest seats at elections must be seen in the context of the aim pursued by the legislature in enacting the Regulations, namely, to secure their political impartiality. That aim must be considered legitimate for the purposes of restricting the exercise of the applicants’ subjective right to stand for election under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1; nor can it be maintained that the restrictions limit the very essence of their rights under that provision having regard to the fact that they only operate for as long as the applicants occupy politically restricted posts; furthermore, any of the applicants wishing to run for elected office is at liberty to resign from his post. "
- "The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and the Contracting States must be afforded a margin of appreciation in this sphere. The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the margin in this area is wide (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Matthews [GC], cited above, § 63; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV; and Podkolzina, cited above, § 33). There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 61, and Scoppola (No. 3) [GC], cited above, § 83). "
- "It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates. Exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 62, and Scoppola (No. 3) [GC], cited above, § 84). "
- "The Court notes that the summary of its case-law on the right to effectively stand for election, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, can be found in, among many other judgments, Orujov v. Azerbaijan (no. 4508/06, §§ 40-42, 26 July 2011). On a more specific note, the Court also reiterates that, while the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote and to stand for election, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate or arbitrary (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113; Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV; and Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 109 (iii), 8 July 2008). "
- "Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not contain a list of “legitimate aims” capable of justifying restrictions on the exercise of the rights it guarantees and does not refer to those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are free to rely on an aim not mentioned in those Articles, provided that it is compatible with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention (see, for example, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR 2006-IV). "
- "The Court notes that a finding that a candidate has engaged in unfair or illegal campaigning methods could entail serious consequences for the candidate concerned, in that he or she could be disqualified from running for the election. As the Convention guarantees the effective exercise of individual electoral rights, the Court considers that, in order to prevent arbitrary disqualification of candidates, the relevant domestic procedures should contain sufficient safeguards protecting the candidates from abusive and unsubstantiated allegations of electoral misconduct, and that decisions on disqualification should be based on sound, relevant and sufficient proof of such misconduct (see Orujov, cited above, § 46). "
- "While Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, the Court's case-law establishes that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election. Although those rights are central to democracy and the rule of law, they are not absolute and may be subject to limitations. The Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with: it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52; and more recently, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV; and Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II). "
- "The Court recalls that this case is primarily about the applicants’ participation in the elections as candidates, i.e. about the passive electoral right. In the context of the “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has stressed that it would be “even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109). "