1726 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 72, 8 April 2010), including the manner of review of the outcome of elections and invalidation of election results (see Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55 et seq., ECHR 2008-...). "
- "The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations” and Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in the sphere of elections (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV). It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. In particular, it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52, and Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV). Such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62). "
- "The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 72, 8 April 2010), including the manner of review of the outcome of elections and invalidation of election results (see Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55 et seq., ECHR 2008-...). "
- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 appears at first sight to differ from the other rights guaranteed in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work to Article 3 of the Protocol and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see, among many other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113; Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 56-57, ECHR 2005-IX; and, more recently, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV). Furthermore, the Court has considered that this Article guarantees the individual’s right to stand for election and, once elected, to sit as a member of parliament (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 50, ECHR 2006-VIII). "
- "The rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. Nonetheless, those rights are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting States must be given a margin of appreciation in this sphere. In this field, Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, provided that they ensure equality of treatment for all citizens. It does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). "
- "It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV). "
- "In Podkolzina v. Latvia (no. 46726/99, ECHR 2002-II), the Court reiterated that the right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires the finding that this or that candidate has failed to satisfy them to comply with a number of criteria framed to prevent arbitrary decisions. In particular, such a finding must be reached by a body which can provide a minimum of guarantees of its impartiality. Similarly, the discretion enjoyed by the body concerned must not be exorbitantly wide; it must be circumscribed, with sufficient precision, by the provisions of domestic law. Lastly, the procedure for declaring a candidate ineligible must be such as to ensure a fair and objective decision and prevent any abuse of power on the part of the relevant authority (ibid., § 35). "
- "The Court reiterates that implicit in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are the subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. Although those rights are important, they are not absolute. In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Sadak and Others (no. 2) v. Turkey, nos. 25144/94 et al., § 31, ECHR 2002-IV). "
- "The Court further reiterates that the object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 18-19, § 33). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires the finding that this or that candidate has failed to satisfy them to comply with a number of criteria framed to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, nos. 55066/00 and 55638/00, § 50, 11 January 2007; Podkolzina, cited above, § 35; and Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 59, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "As regards the legitimate aim, the Court reiterates that each State has a legitimate interest in ensuring the normal functioning of its own institutional system. That applies all the more to the national parliament, which is vested with legislative power and plays a primordial role in a democratic State (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 33). The Court considers that the requirement to submit information on the candidate's employment and party membership serves to enable voters to make an informed choice with regard to the candidate's professional and political background. The introduction of such a requirement does not appear arbitrary or unreasonable. It is also incontestably legitimate to ask the candidates that the information so submitted be accurate to the best of their knowledge, lest the voters be misled by false representations. Accordingly, the Court concludes that requiring a candidate for election to the national parliament to submit truthful information on their employment and party affiliation is a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. "
- "In any event, the Court reiterates that what is relevant for its assessment is the existence of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the measures employed by the domestic authorities and the legitimate aim sought to be achieved (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 117, ECHR 2005-...). "
- "The Court points out that implicit in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides for “free” elections at “reasonable intervals” “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”, are the subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. Although those rights are important, they are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 52). In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see the Gitonas and Others v. Greece judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, pp. 1233-34, § 39, and Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I). "
- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 appears at first sight to differ from the other rights guaranteed in the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation for the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see, among many other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113; Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 56-57, ECHR 2005-IX; and, more recently, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV). Furthermore, the Court has considered that this Article guarantees the individual’s right to stand for election and, once elected, to sit as a member of parliament (see Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 2), nos. 25144/94, 26149/95 to 26154/95, 27100/95 and 27101/95, § 33, ECHR 2002-IV). "
- "The rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. Nonetheless, those rights are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting States must be given a margin of appreciation in this sphere. The Court would reaffirm that the margin in this area is wide (see Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV; and Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II). There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 61). "
- "It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions imposed in the right to vote and to stand for election do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 62). Equally, once the wishes of the people have been freely and democratically expressed, no subsequent amendment to the organisation of the electoral system may call that choice into question, except in the presence of compelling grounds for the democratic order. "
- "As to the nature of the rights thus enshrined in Article 3 (P1-3), the view taken by the Commission has evolved. From the idea of an "institutional" right to the holding of free elections (decision of 18 September 1961 on the admissibility of application no. 1028/61, X v. Belgium, Yearbook of the Convention, vol. 4, p. 338) the Commission has moved to the concept of "universal suffrage" (see particularly the decision of 6 October 1967 on the admissibility of application no. 2728/66, X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 338) and then, as a consequence, to the concept of subjective rights of participation - the "right to vote" and the "right to stand for election to the legislature" (see in particular the decision of 30 May 1975 on the admissibility of applications nos. 6745-6746/76, W, X, Y and Z v. Belgium, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 244). "
- "The rights in question are not absolute. Since Article 3 (P1-3) recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations (see, mutatis mutandis, the Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp. 18-19, § 38). In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3 (P1-3) (Collected Edition of the "Travaux Préparatoires", vol. III, p. 264, and vol. IV, p. 24). They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 (P1) have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see, amongst other authorities and mutatis mutandis, the Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 71, § 194). In particular, such conditions must not thwart "the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature". "
- "As regards the method of appointing the ""legislature"", Article 3 (P1-3) provides only for "free" elections "at reasonable intervals", "by secret ballot" and "under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people". Subject to that, it does not create any "obligation to introduce a specific system" (""Travaux Préparatoires"", vol. VII, pp. 130, 202 and 210, and vol. VIII, p. 14) such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots. Here too the Court recognises that the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation, given that their legislation on the matter varies from place to place and from time to time. Electoral systems seek to fulfil objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand, to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. In these circumstances the phrase "conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature" implies essentially - apart from freedom of expression (already protected under Article 10 of the Convention) (art. 10) - the principle of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to stand for election. It does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate "wasted votes". For the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), any electoral system must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned; features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may accordingly be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the ""free … "
- "The Court recalls that the rights set out in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute, but may be subject to limitations. The Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the right to vote to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see the above-mentioned Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt judgment, p. 23, § 52). "
- "The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides for “free” elections “at reasonable intervals”, “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”, involves the subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. Yet however important they may be, those rights are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for “implied limitations” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113). Under their respective legal systems, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote, which conditions are not, in principle, precluded by Article 3, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the right to vote to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. "
- "Free elections and the freedom of expression, particularly the freedom of political debate, form the foundation of any democratic system. Those two rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing: for example, as the Court has found in the past, freedom of expression is one of the “conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). That is why it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely (see The Communist Party of Russia and Others v. Russia, no. 29400/05, § 107, 19 June 2012). "
- "In certain circumstances the two rights may come into conflict and it may be considered necessary, in the period preceding or during an election, to place certain restrictions, of a type which would not usually be acceptable, on freedom of expression, in order to secure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. The Court recognises that, in striking the balance between these two rights, the Contracting States have a margin of appreciation, as they do generally with regard to the organisation of their electoral systems (see Bowman, § 43, cited above). "
- "As regards restrictions on the exercise of the right to vote abroad based on the criterion of the voter’s place of residence, Convention institutions have in the past accepted several reasons justifying such restrictions: first of all, the presumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country (see Hilbe v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999-VI ; X and association Y v. Italy, no. 8987/80, Commission decision of 6 May 1981, Decisions and Reports (DR) 24, p. 192 ; and Polacco and Garofalo v. Italy, no. 23450/94, Commission decision of 15 September 1997, DR 90-B, p. 5). More recently the Court held that having to satisfy a residence or length-of-residence requirement in order to have or exercise the right to vote in elections is not, in principle, an arbitrary restriction of the right to vote and is therefore not incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Doyle v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30158/06, 6 February 2007, and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, § 69, ECHR 2012). "
- "The Court reiterates that national practices concerning voting rights for expatriates and the exercise of such rights are far from being uniform across the States Parties. Broadly speaking, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not impose on States Parties any obligation to enable citizens resident abroad to exercise their right to vote (see Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos [GC], cited above, §§ 74 and 75). Furthermore, the work of the Venice Commission has shown that withholding or limiting the voting rights of expatriates does not amount to a restriction on the principle of universal suffrage. In fact, the different interests involved should be weighed up, including the State’s choice to enable its expatriate citizens to exercise their voting rights, practical and security considerations relating to the exercise of this right, and the technical arrangements for implementing it. "
- "Compl[y] fully with their international human rights law obligations and commitments with regard to participation in political and public affairs, including reflecting them in their national legislative framework."
- "[Consider] signing and ratifying or acceding to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other core international human rights treaties. "
- "Tak[e] all necessary measures to eliminate laws, regulations and practices that discriminate, directly or indirectly, against citizens in their right to participate in public affairs on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, or on the basis of disability. "
- "Tak[e] proactive measures to eliminate all barriers in law and in practice that prevent or hinder citizens, in particular women, persons belonging to marginalized groups or minorities, persons with disabilities and persons in vulnerable situations, from participating fully in effectively in political and public affairs, including, inter alia, reviewing and repealing measures that unreasonably restrict the right to participate in public affairs, and considering adopting, on the basis of reliable data on participation, temporary special measure, including legislative acts, aimed at increasing the participation of underrepresented groups in all aspects of political and public life; "
- "The Committee notes that it is for the State party to show that the restriction on the author’s freedom of speech was necessary in the present case. Even if a State party may introduce a permit system aiming to strike a balance between an individual’s freedom of speech and the general interest in maintaining public order in a certain area, such a system must not operate in a way that is incompatible with article 19 of the Covenant. In the present case, the author made a public address on issues of public interest. On the evidence of the material before the Committee, there was no suggestion that the author’s address was either threatening, unduly disruptive or otherwise likely to jeopardise public order in the mall; indeed, police officers present, rather than seeking to curtail the author’s address, allowed him to proceed while videotaping him. The author delivered his speech without a permit. For this, he was fined and, when he failed to pay the fine, he was held in custody for five days. The Committee considers that the State party’s reaction in response to the author’s conduct was disproportionate and amounted to a restriction of the author’s freedom of speech which was not compatible with article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. It follows that there was a violation of article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. "
- "The right to information is hereby guaranteed in accordance with the following principles:Every person has the right to access information of public bodies and relevant private bodies expeditiously and inexpensively."
- "The circumstances in which the lethal use of force by security forces is permitted are strictly circumscribed by international human rights law: the force must be necessary and proportionate to the threat posed, and intentional lethal force is only permitted where it is necessary to protect life."
- "The government, with international assistance where appropriate, should undertake an independent review of the events to determine the causes of the violence and necessary reforms. Investigations in such cases should aim to review the individual and structural causes or conditions for the killings in full, including whether the police use of force guidelines comply with the international law on the use of force; whether the police have any and appropriate plans for crowd-control situations; whether police have equipment and weapons appropriate for crowd control; the role of police intelligence; whether there were failures in the police command and control; and what orders were given to police."
- "Depoliticization may require structural changes to recruitment processes for the particular security force, to encourage the development of a force that is broadly representative and not composed solely of those personally loyal to a leader."
- "Increased security should be focused on candidates and polling sites. Increased security should be planned not just for election day, but also especially in the preelection period, and should continue into the post-election period where necessary."
- "In addition, the police, because of resource or training deficiencies, may be unable to meet to their international due diligence obligations to effectively prevent violence."
- "Political or other bias by the police may result in failures to protect civilians from violence (by, for example, not intervening to prevent physical attacks, or by failing to arrest perpetrators)."
- "In countries with a track record of election violence, governments should draw up plans for dealing with such violence in the future in ways that are consistent with their human rights obligations. (...) While some of the details of such contingency planning will need to remain confidential, it is also essential that the authorities release enough detailed information in order to make it clear that serious planning has been undertaken, as well as to discourage those potentially violent forces who might otherwise assume there will be few obstacles to, and no consequences flowing from, their actions."
- "To ensure a transparent and fair campaign finance system, both routine political party financing and campaign financing must be considered in the legislation."
- "The law should clearly establish timeframes for which campaign finance regulations are applicable, including dates for reporting and disclosure, and statutes of limitations for violations."
- "For campaign finance laws or regulations to be meaningful, it is essential for them to require disclosure through clear, detailed and periodic reporting on contributions and expenditures."
- "Sanctions should be imposed on electoral contestants who violate campaign finance regulations. Sanctions should eliminate any benefit obtained from failing to comply with the law, punish those who fail to comply and deter future non-compliance."
- "Sanctions must at all times be objective, enforceable, effective and proportionate to their specific purpose. A range of sanctions may be applied, including warnings, administrative fines, partial or total loss of public funds and, in the case of significant violations, criminal prosecution."
- "Where sanctions are imposed, it is essential that the sanctioned parties have the right to appeal and have recourse to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal that can provide an effective remedy."
- "To allow for the effective regulation of the use of state resources, legislation should clearly define what use is permitted and what is prohibited."
- "Although a participating State has the flexibility to determine the structure of the legal framework for campaign finance, the primary instruments should be written, as opposed to being based on custom or a collection of administrative policies. Written law provides the benefit of equity, certainty, visibility and transparency. It enhances the consistent application of law and makes the matter subject to judicial interpretation and review, as well as open to recourse by citizens."
- "The rules governing campaign finance legislation should be as clear and precise as possible, including the key terminology. Interpretation of the regulations should not be a matter of subjective opinion."
- "The oversight body’s mandate and areas of responsibility should be clearly delineated to avoid conflicts of interest or overlapping jurisdiction."
- "Campaign finance rules should ensure equality of opportunity for parties and candidates alike. Special measures may be incorporated to encourage more balanced participation of underrepresented groups, such as women, national minorities or persons with disabilities."
- "Campaign finance rules should be adopted in an inclusive manner and be published and made available to the public in a timely and accessible manner."
- "Limitations on contributions can be means to minimize the possibility of corruption or the purchasing of political influence."