246 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "The Code of good practice in electoral matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, item II.2.B) states : “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.” II. The Venice Commission interprets this text as follows: 1. The principle according to which the fundamental elements of electoral law should not be open to amendment less than one year prior to an election does not take precedence over the other principles of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. "
- "The Code of good practice in electoral matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, item II.2.B) states : “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.” II. The Venice Commission interprets this text as follow 2. It should not be invoked to maintain a situation contrary to the standards of the European electoral heritage, or to prevent the implementation of recommendations by international organisations. "
- "The Code of good practice in electoral matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, item II.2.B) states: “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.” II. The Venice Commission interprets this text as follows: 3. This principle only concerns the fundamental rules of electoral law, when they appear in ordinary law. "
- "The Code of good practice in electoral matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, item II.2.B) states : “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.” II. The Venice Commission interprets this text as follows: 4. In particular, the following are considered fundamental rules : - the electoral system proper, i.e. rules relating to the transformation of votes into seats; - rules relating to the membership of electoral commissions or another body which organizes the ballot; - the drawing of constituency boundaries and rules relating to the distribution of seats between the constituencies. "
- "The Code of good practice in electoral matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, item II.2.B) states : “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.” II. The Venice Commission interprets this text as follows: 5. In general any reform of electoral legislation to be applied during an election should occur early enough for it to be really applicable to the election. "
- "It is very important that the duties and responsibilities of each body are clearly determined by the electoral law. Sometimes, however, provisions regarding responsibilities of election commissions are vague, and the relationship between the different level of electoral commissions is not sufficiently specified. "
- "As far as public funding is concerned, the principle of equal opportunities is of utmost importance. In general, there is a consensus on this principle of equal opportunities. Since money is involved, however, there are sometimes political conflicts about the interpretation of the principle. In may be applied in either a strict sense (equal treatment) or in a proportional sense (according to the strength in parliament or among the electorate). Thus, it is quite a challenge to find a generally accepted formula in the respective country. Relevant rules should be included in the law. "
- "Especially with dual complaint and appeal procedures, which involve electoral commissions and ordinary courts, the electoral law should clearly regulate the respective powers and responsibilities so that a conflict of jurisdiction can be avoided. Neither the appellants nor the authorities should be able to choose the appeal body (see CDLAD(2002)023rev, II.3.3.c. and para. 97). Thus, the possibility of concurrent complaints procedures is avoided. Furthermore, it should be clear which bodies act as first instance fact finding bodies and which bodies act as appellate review bodies. "
- "Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal being voted on. This entails a neutral attitude by administrative authorities, in particular with regard to: i. the referendum campaign; ii. coverage by the media, in particular by the publicly owned media; iii. public funding of campaign and its actors; iv. billposting and advertising; v. the right to demonstrate on public thoroughfares. "
- "Sanctions must be imposed in the case of breaches of the duty of neutrality. "
- "Voters must not find themselves obliged to reveal their membership of a national minority. "
- "Sanctions must be imposed in the case of breaches of the duty of neutrality and of voters’ freedom to form an opinion. "
- "There should be sanctions against the violation of secret sufrage. "
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute. "
- "The fundamental aspects of referendum law should not be open to amendment less than one year before a referendum, or should be written in the Constitution or at a level superior to ordinary law"
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute. "
- "The fundamental aspects of referendum law should not be open to amendment less than one year before a referendum, or should be written in the Constitution or at a level superior to ordinary law. "
- "The applicant’s right to a hearing involving both parties must be protected. "
- "The use of referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction. "
- "The procedural validity of texts submitted to a referendum Questions submitted to a referendum must respect: - unity of form: the same question must not combine a specifically-worded draft amendment with a generally-worded proposal or a question of principle; - unity of content: except in the case of total revision of a text (Constitution, law), there must be an intrinsic connection between the various parts of each question put to the vote, in order to guarantee the free suffrage of the voter, who must not be called to accept or refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic link; the revision of several chapters of a text at the same time is equivalent to a total revision; - unity of hierarchical level: it is desirable that the same question should not simultaneously apply to legislation of different hierarchical levels. "
- "The substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum Texts submitted to a referendum must comply with all superior law (principle of the hierarchy of norms). They must not be contrary to international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles (democracy, human rights and the rule of law). "
- "Everyone enjoying political rights is entitled to sign a popular initiative or request for a referendum. "
- "When the referendum is legally binding: i. For a certain period of time, a text that has been rejected in a referendum may not be adopted by a procedure without referendum. ii. During the same period of time, a provision that has been accepted in a referendum may not be revised by another method. iii. The above does not apply in the case of a referendum on partial revision of a text, where the previous referendum concerned a total revision. iv. The revision of a rule of superior law that is contrary to the popular vote is not legally unacceptable but should be avoided during the above-mentioned period. v. In the event of rejection of a text adopted by Parliament and put to the popular vote at the request of a section of the electorate, a similar new text must not be put to the vote unless a referendum is requested. "
- "When a text is adopted by referendum at the request of an authority other than Parliament, it should be possible to revise it either by parliamentary means or by referendum, at the request of Parliament or a section of the electorate, after the expiry, where applicable, of the same period of time. "
- "The effects of legally binding or consultative referendums must be clearly specified in the Constitution or by law. "
- "Referendums on questions of principle or other generally-worded proposals should preferably not be binding. If they are binding, the subsequent procedure should be laid down in specific rules. "
- "Out-of-country voting guarantees equality between citizens living in the country and expatriates. "
- "As to parliamentary elections, the Court notes that the rights safeguarded by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute but subject to restrictions. The Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation to make the right to vote subject to conditions, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 52, and Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I). "
- "The Committee considers that the evaluation of any restrictions must be effected on a case-by-case basis, having regard in particular to the purpose of such restrictions and the principle of proportionality. "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such issues as the assessment of evidence or the interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purposes of supervision of the compatibility of the interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such matters as assessment of evidence or interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purpose of supervision of the compatibility of an interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "According to the Court's case-law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory, for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention, if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, pp. 35-36, § 72). Moreover, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 39, ECHR 2002-IV). "
- "There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23 § 52). The State’s margin of appreciation, however, is not unlimited. It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that any such conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Gitonas and Others v. Greece, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p. 233, § 39; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II; and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52). "
- "Residence requirements have previously found to be justified by the following factors: firstly, the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country. Even where it may be possible that the applicant has not severed ties with his country of origin and that some of the factors indicated above are therefore inapplicable to this case, the law cannot always take account of every individual case but must lay down a general rule. "
- "Free elections and freedom of expression, and particularly the freedom of political debate, form the foundation of any democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113, and Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §§ 41 and 42, Series A no. 103). The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere since there are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 51, ECHR 2006-VIII). "
- "This standard of tolerance does not prevent a democratic society from taking steps to protect itself against activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual's capacity to influence the composition of the legislature, does not therefore exclude the possibility of restrictions on electoral rights being imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct has threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations (see, for example, X v. the Netherlands, cited above, and, mutatis mutandis, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Commission decision of 11 October 1979, Decisions and Reports 18, where the Commission declared inadmissible two applications concerning the refusal to allow the applicants, who were the leaders of a proscribed organisation with racist and xenophobic traits, to stand for election). The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned. "
- "The Court points out that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not, like other provisions of the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a restriction must pursue. A wide range of purposes may therefore be compatible with Article 3 (see, for example, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 34, ECHR 2002-II). "
- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a principle that is characteristic of an effective political democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (ibid., §§ 46-51). "
- "Political party, candidates and election campaign funding must be transparent. "
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: iv. funding of parties and candidates. "
- "Sanctions must be imposed in the case of breaches of duty of neutrality and voters' freedom to form an opinion. "
- "The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned. "
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail – which may be included in regulations of the executive –, rules of electoral law must have at least the rank of a statute. "
- "The vote counting should be conducted in a transparent manner. It is admissible that voters registered in the polling station may attend; the presence of national or international observers should be authorised. These persons must be allowed to be present in all circumstances. There must be enough copies of the record of the proceedings to distribute to ensure that all the aforementioned persons receive one; one copy must be immediately posted on the notice-board, another kept at the polling station and a third sent to the commission or competent higher authority. "
- "The relevant regulations should stipulate certain practical precautions as regards equipment. For example, the record of the proceedings should be completed in ballpoint pen rather than pencil, as text written in pencil can be erased. "
- "In practice, it appears that the time needed to count the votes depends on the efficiency of the presiding officer of the polling station. These times can vary markedly, which is why a simple tried and tested procedure should be set out in the legislation or permanent regulations which appear in the training manual for polling station officials. "
- "Violation of the secrecy of the ballot must be punished, just like violations of other aspects of voter freedom. "
- "Stability of the law is crucial to credibility of the electoral process, which is itself vital to consolidating democracy. Rules which change frequently – and especially rules which are complicated – may confuse voters. Above all, voters may conclude, rightly or wrongly, that electoral law is simply a tool in the hands of the powerful, and that their own votes have little weight in deciding the results of elections. "
- "In practice, however, it is not so much stability of the basic principles which needs protecting (they are not likely to be seriously challenged) as stability of some of the more specific rules of electoral law, especially those covering the electoral system per se, the composition of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries. These three elements are often, rightly or wrongly, regarded as decisive factors in the election results, and care must be taken to avoid not only manipulation to the advantage of the party in power, but even the mere semblance of manipulation."
- "It is not so much changing voting systems which is a bad thing – they can always be changed for the better – as changing them frequently or just before (within one year of) elections. Even when no manipulation is intended, changes will seem to be dictated by immediate party political interests. "