1059 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "Voters must not find themselves obliged to reveal their membership of a national minority. "
- "Voting procedures must be readily understandable by citizens; ii. voters should always have the possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are acceptable under the following conditions: iii. postal voting should be allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and intimidation must not be possible. "
- "[P]ostal voting should be allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and intimidation must not be possible; "
- "[E]lectronic voting should be in conformity with Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec(2004)11 on Legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting. In particular, it should be used only if it is safe, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters; the system must be transparent; unless channels of remote electronic voting are universally accessible, they shall be only an additional and optional means of voting. "
- "[V]ery strict rules must apply to voting by proxy; the number of proxies a single voter may hold must be limited "
- "[M]obile ballot boxes should only be allowed under strict conditions that avoid all risks of fraud. "
- "[A]t least two criteria should be used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot: the number of votes cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot box; viii. voting slips must not be tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials; ix. unused and invalid voting slips must never leave the polling station; x. polling stations must include representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed by the latter or by other groups that have taken a stand on the issue put to the vote must be permitted during voting and counting. "
- "[V]oting slips must not be tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials. "
- "[U]nused and invalid voting slips must never leave the polling station. "
- "[M]ilitary personnel should vote at their place of residence whenever possible. Otherwise, it is advisable that they be registered to vote at the polling station nearest to their duty station. "
- "Democratic referendums are not possible without respect for human rights, in particular freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of movement inside the country, freedom of assembly and freedom of association for political purposes, including freedom to set up political parties. "
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute. "
- "The fundamental aspects of referendum law should not be open to amendment less than one year before a referendum, or should be written in the Constitution or at a level superior to ordinary law"
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute. "
- "Time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short. "
- "The use of referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction. "
- "The procedural validity of texts submitted to a referendum Questions submitted to a referendum must respect: - unity of form: the same question must not combine a specifically-worded draft amendment with a generally-worded proposal or a question of principle; - unity of content: except in the case of total revision of a text (Constitution, law), there must be an intrinsic connection between the various parts of each question put to the vote, in order to guarantee the free suffrage of the voter, who must not be called to accept or refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic link; the revision of several chapters of a text at the same time is equivalent to a total revision; - unity of hierarchical level: it is desirable that the same question should not simultaneously apply to legislation of different hierarchical levels. "
- "The substantive validity of texts submitted to a referendum Texts submitted to a referendum must comply with all superior law (principle of the hierarchy of norms). They must not be contrary to international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles (democracy, human rights and the rule of law). "
- "Everyone enjoying political rights is entitled to sign a popular initiative or request for a referendum. "
- "When a text is adopted by referendum at the request of an authority other than Parliament, it should be possible to revise it either by parliamentary means or by referendum, at the request of Parliament or a section of the electorate, after the expiry, where applicable, of the same period of time. "
- "The effects of legally binding or consultative referendums must be clearly specified in the Constitution or by law. "
- "Referendums on questions of principle or other generally-worded proposals should preferably not be binding. If they are binding, the subsequent procedure should be laid down in specific rules. "
- "The European Court of Human Rights held that the restriction of the right to vote to citizens resident in national territory could be justified on the following grounds: “(1) the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or continuously concerned with, and has less knowledge of, a country’s day-to-day problems; (2) the impracticality and sometimes undesirability (in some cases impossibility) of parliamentary candidates presenting the different electoral issues to citizens living abroad so as to secure the free expression of opinion; (3) the influence of resident citizens on the selection of candidates and on the formulation of their electoral programmes; and (4) the correlation between one’s right to vote in parliamentary elections and being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected”. "
- "The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters produced by the Venice Commission provides simply that “the right to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad”, without making it a requirement to grant such a right. "
- "Voting from abroad is subject to a number of practical conditions, beginning with registration on the electoral roll. Generally, a prior application is required from the citizen abroad (“active” registration system). In these cases, it is necessary to determine the deadline for citizens to register, the form required for this type of declaration and the authority to which these applications must be made. "
- "Out-of-country voting guarantees equality between citizens living in the country and expatriates. "
- "It is perfectly legitimate to require voters living abroad to register to be able to vote, even if registration is automatic for residents. "
- "The obligation to vote in an embassy or consulate may in practice severely restrict the right to vote of citizens living abroad. This restriction may be justified on the grounds that the other means of voting (postal vote, proxy voting, e-voting) are not always reliable. "
- "The European Commission of Human Rights has decided on several occasions in the past that having to satisfy a residence requirement in order to have or exercise the right to vote in parliamentary elections is not an arbitrary restriction of the right to vote and is therefore not incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see X and Association Y v. Italy, application no. 8987/80, Commission decision of 6 May 1981, Decisions and Reports (DR) 24, p. 192; X v. the United Kingdom, application no. 7730/76, Commission decision of 28 February 1979, DR 15, p. 137; and Luksch v. Germany, application no. 35385/97, Commission decision of 21 May 1997, DR 89-B, p. 175). "
- "The Court considers that the residence requirement which prompted the application is justified on account of the following factors: firstly, the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country. "
- "It is possible that the applicant has not severed ties with his country of origin and that some of the factors indicated above are therefore inapplicable to this case. However, the law cannot take account of every individual case but must lay down a general rule. Furthermore, the applicant cannot argue that he is affected by the acts of political institutions to the same extent as resident citizens. Thus the applicant’s situation is different from that of a resident citizen, and that justifies the residence requirement. "
- "It should be recalled that the right to vote is not a privilege. In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 59; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 67). The exclusion from the right to vote of any groups or categories of the general population must be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Ždanoka, cited above, § 105; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 67). Any general, automatic and indiscriminate departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates (see Hirst (no. 2), § 62; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 68). "
- "The Court has previously implied that the ease with which an applicant can acquire the citizenship of his State of residence, and thus exercise his right to vote in that country, may be relevant to the proportionality of a residence requirement in his State of origin (see Doyle, cited above). The possibility of acquiring a new citizenship is not, however, decisive given that the acquisition of such citizenship may have adverse consequences in other areas of one’s life and that an applicant’s interest in casting his vote in the State to which he feels most closely connected must also be given due weight. "
- "Accordingly, the exclusion from the right to vote of any groups or categories of the general population must be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Ždanoka, cited above, § 105). The Court has held, inter alia, that domestic legislation making the right to vote subject to a minimum age or to residence conditions is, in principle, compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Hirst, § 62, and Hilbe, both cited above). It has acknowledged that any general, automatic and indiscriminate departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates (see Hirst, cited above). "
- "As to the condition of residence in relation to the right to stand for elections, as such, the Court has never expressed its opinion on this point. However, in relation to the separate right to vote, the Court has held that it was not per se an unreasonable or arbitrary requirement (see Hilbe v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 31981/96, ECHR 1999-VI). The Court considers that a residence requirement for voting may be justified on the following grounds: (1) the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or continuously concerned with, and has less knowledge of, a country’s day-to-day problems; (2) the impracticality and sometimes undesirability (in some cases impossibility) of parliamentary candidates presenting the different electoral issues to citizens living abroad so as to secure the free expression of opinion; (3) the influence of resident citizens on the selection of candidates and on the formulation of their electoral programmes; and (4) the correlation between one’s right to vote in parliamentary elections and being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected (see Polacco and Garofalo v. Italy, no. 23450/94, Commission decision of 15 September 1997, Decisions and Reports 90-A, referring to previous Commission case-law). "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such issues as the assessment of evidence or the interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purposes of supervision of the compatibility of the interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "The Court points out that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not, like other provisions of the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a restriction must pursue and that a wide range of purposes may therefore be compatible with Article 3. The Government submitted that the measure complained of pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions and making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs. "
- "The Court cannot accept, however, that an absolute bar on voting by any person under partial guardianship, irrespective of his or her actual faculties, falls within an acceptable margin of appreciation. Indeed, while the Court reiterates that this margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-embracing (Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], op. cit., § 82). In addition, if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suffered considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the State's margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in question (cf. also the example of those suffering different treatment on the ground of their gender - Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 78, Series A no. 94, race - D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 182, ECHR 2007-..., or sexual orientation - E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 94, ECHR 2008-...). The reason for this approach, which questions certain classifications per se, is that such groups were historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice may entail legislative stereotyping which prohibits the individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs (cf. Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009/05, § 95, 27 March 2008). "
- "The Court further considers that the treatment as a single class of those with intellectual or mental disabilities is a questionable classification, and the curtailment of their rights must be subject to strict scrutiny. This approach is reflected in other instruments of international law, referred to above (paragraphs 14-17). The Court therefore concludes that an indiscriminate removal of voting rights, without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely based on a mental disability necessitating partial guardianship, cannot be considered compatible with the legitimate grounds for restricting the right to vote. "
- "The Court notes that the rights guaranteed by this Article are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 58, and Scoppola (no. 3) [GC], cited above, § 82). In addition, the right to vote is not a privilege. In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion and universal suffrage has become the basic principle (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 51; Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 59; and Scoppola (no. 3) [GC], cited above, § 82). The same rights are enshrined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see paragraph 38 above). "
- "The Court has already addressed the issue of the disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners. In particular, in the Hirst (no. 2) case, it noted that there is no question that a prisoner forfeits his Convention rights merely because of his status as a person detained following conviction. Nor is there any place under the Convention system, where tolerance and broadmindedness are the acknowledged hallmarks of democratic society, for automatic disenfranchisement based purely on what might offend public opinion (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 70). According to the Court, this standard of tolerance does not prevent a democratic society from taking steps to protect itself against activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual’s capacity to influence the composition of the law-making power, does not therefore exclude that restrictions on electoral rights could be imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations. The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned (ibid., § 71). "
- "The Court also considered that where Contracting States had adopted a number of different ways of addressing the question, the Court must confine itself “to determining whether the restriction affecting all convicted prisoners in custody exceed[ed] any acceptable margin of appreciation, leaving it to the legislature to decide on the choice of means for securing the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (ibid., § 84, and Greens and M.T., cited above, §§ 113 and 114). "
- "The Court reiterates in this connection that removal of the right to vote without any ad hoc judicial decision does not, in itself, give rise to a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Scoppola (no. 3) [GC], cited above, § 104). With a view to securing the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Contracting States may decide either to leave it to the courts to determine the proportionality of a measure restricting convicted prisoners’ voting rights, or to incorporate provisions into their laws defining the circumstances in which such a measure should be applied. "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such matters as assessment of evidence or interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purpose of supervision of the compatibility of an interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "The Court reiterates that considerations of expediency and the necessity for tight time-limits designed to avoid delaying the electoral process, although often justified, may nevertheless not serve as a pretext to undermine the effectiveness of electoral procedures (see, mutatis mutandis, Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 90, 8 April 2010) or to deprive the persons concerned by those procedures of the opportunity to effectively contest any accusations of electoral misconduct made against them (see Orujov, cited above, § 56). "
- "According to the Court's case-law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory, for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention, if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, pp. 35-36, § 72). Moreover, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 39, ECHR 2002-IV). "
- "[T]he right to vote must be acquired, at the latest, at the age of majority"
- "The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would be merely illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 35). This principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55, ECHR 2008). "
- "[T]he right to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad. "
- "[E]lectoral registers must be permanent."