3619 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a fundamental principle of an effective political democracy. It implies the subjective rights to vote and to stand for election (see Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 34932/04, § 96, 6 January 2011). This provision also expressly refers to “conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. In the 1987 case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium (judgment of 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A no. 113), the Court noted that this part of Article 3 “implies essentially - apart from freedom of expression ... - the principle of equality of treatment ...”. Thus, already at that time the Court recognised that “freedom of expression” was an important part of the “free expression of the opinion”. The interrelation between free elections and freedom of expression was also emphasised in Bowman v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, § 42), where the Court held that “it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely”. Lastly, in Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], cited above, the Court held that the State was under an obligation to adopt positive measures to organise elections “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. "
- "The Court recalls that this case is primarily about the applicants’ participation in the elections as candidates, i.e. about the passive electoral right. In the context of the “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has stressed that it would be “even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109). "
- "In most of the previous cases under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the Court has had to consider a specific legislative provision or a known administrative measure which has somehow limited the electoral rights of a group of the population or of a specific candidate. In those cases the measure complained of lay within the legal field, and, therefore, could be easily identified and analysed (see, for example, the cases concerning electoral thresholds (Yumak and Sadak, cited above), the right of prisoners to vote (Hirst, cited above), criteria of eligibility of candidates on account of their political affiliation or other status (Ždanoka, cited above; Seyidzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, 3 December 2009), compositions of electoral commissions (The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, ECHR 2008), restrictions on reporting on a particular political movement (Purcell and Others v. Ireland, no. 15404/89, 16 April 1991), or impossibility for nationals living abroad to vote (Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, 15 March 2012). "
- "“In the context of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the primary obligation is not one of abstention or non-interference, as with the majority of civil and political rights, but one of adoption by the State of positive measures to “hold democratic elections” (Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, § 67, 15 March 2012). The next question is thus whether the State was under any positive obligation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to ensure that media coverage by the State-controlled mass-media was balanced and compatible with the spirit of “free elections”, even where no direct proof of deliberate manipulation was found. In examining this question the Court will bear in mind that “States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the field of electoral legislation” (see Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, no. 13716/02, § 68, ECHR 2006-VI), which is a fortiori true where the case concerns the extent of the State’s positive obligations, and that the State is only required to take those measures which are “reasonably available” (see, mutatis mutandis, E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, § 99, 26 November 2002). "
- "The Court reiterates that it has interpreted Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as containing certain positive obligations of a procedural character, in particular requiring the existence of a “domestic system for effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights” (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 81 et seq., 8 April 2010; see also the recommendation of the Venice Commission in the Explanatory Report to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Methods concerning creation of an effective system of electoral appeals, paragraph 51 above). The Court refers to its earlier findings under Article 13 in this case that the applicants had at their disposal at least one effective remedy. The Court does not need to define in abstracto the exact relation between the State’s positive obligation under Article 13 and its procedural obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. "
- "[T]he right to vote must be acquired, at the latest, at the age of majority"
- "There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23 § 52). The State’s margin of appreciation, however, is not unlimited. It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that any such conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Gitonas and Others v. Greece, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p. 233, § 39; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II; and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52). "
- "Residence requirements have previously found to be justified by the following factors: firstly, the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country. Even where it may be possible that the applicant has not severed ties with his country of origin and that some of the factors indicated above are therefore inapplicable to this case, the law cannot always take account of every individual case but must lay down a general rule. "
- "Free elections and freedom of expression, and particularly the freedom of political debate, form the foundation of any democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113, and Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §§ 41 and 42, Series A no. 103). The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere since there are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 51, ECHR 2006-VIII). "
- "It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates. Exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004-V). "
- "This standard of tolerance does not prevent a democratic society from taking steps to protect itself against activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual's capacity to influence the composition of the legislature, does not therefore exclude the possibility of restrictions on electoral rights being imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct has threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations (see, for example, X v. the Netherlands, cited above, and, mutatis mutandis, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Commission decision of 11 October 1979, Decisions and Reports 18, where the Commission declared inadmissible two applications concerning the refusal to allow the applicants, who were the leaders of a proscribed organisation with racist and xenophobic traits, to stand for election). The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned. "
- "Disenfranchisement may only be envisaged for a rather narrowly defined group of offenders serving a lengthy term of imprisonment; there should be a direct link between the facts on which a conviction is based and the sanction of disenfranchisement; and such a measure should preferably be imposed not by operation of a law but by the decision of a judge following judicial proceedings (ibid., §§ 77-78). In finding a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court put much emphasis on the fact that the disenfranchisement operating under United Kingdom law was a “blunt instrument”, imposing a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison and doing so in a way which was indiscriminate, applying to all prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances (ibid., § 82). "
- "The Court points out that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not, like other provisions of the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a restriction must pursue. A wide range of purposes may therefore be compatible with Article 3 (see, for example, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 34, ECHR 2002-II). "
- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a principle that is characteristic of an effective political democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (ibid., §§ 46-51). "
- "The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would be merely illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 35). This principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55, ECHR 2008). "
- "The Court has established that the existence of a domestic system for the effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights is one of the essential guarantees of free and fair elections. Such a system ensures an effective exercise of individual rights to vote and to stand for election, maintains general confidence in the State’s administration of the electoral process and constitutes an important device at the State’s disposal in achieving the fulfilment of its positive duty under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold democratic elections. Indeed, the State’s solemn undertaking under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the individual rights guaranteed by that provision would be illusory if, throughout the electoral process, specific instances indicative of failure to ensure democratic elections are not open to challenge by individuals before a competent domestic body capable of effectively dealing with the matter (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 81, 8 April 2010). "
- "The Court has also emphasised that it is important for the authorities in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, § 101, ECHR 2008) and for their decisions to be sufficiently well reasoned (see Namat Aliyev, cited above, §§ 81-90). "
- "[T]he right to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad. "
- "[T]he right to stand for election should preferably be acquired at the same age as the right to vote and in any case not later than the age of 25, except where there are specific qualifying ages for certain offices (e.g. member of the upper house of parliament, Head of State). "
- "[E]lectoral registers must be permanent."
- "The presentation of individual candidates or lists of candidates may be made conditional on the collection of a minimum number of signatures; ii. The law should not require collection of the signatures of more than 1% of voters in the constituency concerned; iii. Checking of signatures must be governed by clear rules, particularly concerning deadlines; iv. The checking process must in principle cover all signatures; however, once it has been established beyond doubt that the requisite number of signatures has been collected, the remaining signatures need not be checked; v. Validation of signatures must be completed by the start of the election campaign"
- "If a deposit is required, it must be refundable should the candidate or party exceed a certain score; the sum and the score requested should not be excessive. "
- "With multi-member constituencies, seats should preferably be redistributed without redefining constituency boundaries, which should, where possible, coincide with administrative boundaries. "
- "Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for parties and candidates alike. This entails a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to: i. the election campaign."
- "Political party, candidates and election campaign funding must be transparent. "
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: i. media."
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: ii. billposting; "
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: iii. the right to demonstrate. "
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: iv. funding of parties and candidates. "
- "Sanctions must be imposed in the case of breaches of duty of neutrality and voters' freedom to form an opinion. "
- "[V]oters should always have the possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are acceptable under the following conditions: iii. postal voting should be allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and intimidation must not be possible."
- "[E]lectronic voting should be used only if it is safe and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage; the system must be transparent. "
- "[V]ery strict rules must apply to voting by proxy; the number of proxies a single voter may hold must be limited. "
- "[M]obile ballot boxes should only be allowed under strict conditions, avoiding all risks of fraud. "
- "[A]t least two criteria should be used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot: the number of votes cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot box."
- "[V]oting slips must not be tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials."
- "[U]nused voting slips must never leave the polling station. "
- "[P]olling stations must include representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed by the candidates must be permitted during voting and counting. "
- "[C]ounting should preferably take place in polling stations. "
- "[C]ounting must be transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and the media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the records."
- " [R]esults must be transmitted to the higher level in an open manner."
- "The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned. "
- "The following must be elected by direct suffrage: i. at least one chamber of the national parliament; ii. sub-national legislative bodies; iii. local councils. "
- "Elections must be held at regular intervals; a legislative assembly’s term of office must not exceed five years. "
- "Apart from rules on technical matters and detail – which may be included in regulations of the executive –, rules of electoral law must have at least the rank of a statute. "
- " It [the central electoral commission] should include: i. at least one member of the judiciary; ii. representatives of parties already in parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters. It may include: iii. a representative of the Ministry of the Interior; iv. representatives of national minorities. "
- "The bodies appointing members of electoral commissions must not be free to dismiss them at will. "
- "It is desirable that electoral commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus. "
- "The procedure must be simple and devoid of formalism, in particular concerning the admissibility of appeals. "
- "Time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance). "