1136 Results
Quotes
Quotes based on international documents, law, and treaties- "In that connection, the Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the Convention requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not just theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, for example, Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15-16, § 33; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 18-19, § 33; and Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic system, would be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions. "
- "The Committee considers that the evaluation of any restrictions must be effected on a case-by-case basis, having regard in particular to the purpose of such restrictions and the principle of proportionality. "
- "The Court also reiterates that, while the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote and to stand for election, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate or arbitrary (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113; Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV; and Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 109 (iii), 8 July 2008). "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such issues as the assessment of evidence or the interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purposes of supervision of the compatibility of the interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "The Court notes that a finding that a candidate has engaged in unfair or illegal campaigning methods could entail serious consequences for the candidate concerned, in that he or she could be disqualified from running for the election. As the Convention guarantees the effective exercise of individual electoral rights, the Court considers that, in order to prevent arbitrary disqualification of candidates, the relevant domestic procedures should contain sufficient safeguards protecting the candidates from abusive and unsubstantiated allegations of electoral misconduct, and that decisions on disqualification should be based on sound, relevant and sufficient proof of such misconduct (see Orujov, cited above, § 46). "
- "The Court recalls that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 implies subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. As important as those rights are, they are not, however, absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations. In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. The Court considers that the restrictions imposed on the applicants’ right to contest seats at elections must be seen in the context of the aim pursued by the legislature in enacting the Regulations, namely, to secure their political impartiality. That aim must be considered legitimate for the purposes of restricting the exercise of the applicants’ subjective right to stand for election under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1; nor can it be maintained that the restrictions limit the very essence of their rights under that provision having regard to the fact that they only operate for as long as the applicants occupy politically restricted posts; furthermore, any of the applicants wishing to run for elected office is at liberty to resign from his post. "
- "The Court notes that the rights guaranteed by this Article are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 58, and Scoppola (no. 3) [GC], cited above, § 82). In addition, the right to vote is not a privilege. In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion and universal suffrage has become the basic principle (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 51; Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 59; and Scoppola (no. 3) [GC], cited above, § 82). The same rights are enshrined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see paragraph 38 above). "
- "The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and the Contracting States must be afforded a margin of appreciation in this sphere. The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the margin in this area is wide (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Matthews [GC], cited above, § 63; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV; and Podkolzina, cited above, § 33). There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 61, and Scoppola (No. 3) [GC], cited above, § 83). "
- "It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates. Exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Hirst (no. 2) [GC], cited above, § 62, and Scoppola (No. 3) [GC], cited above, § 84). "
- "The Court notes that the summary of its case-law on the right to effectively stand for election, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, can be found in, among many other judgments, Orujov v. Azerbaijan (no. 4508/06, §§ 40-42, 26 July 2011). On a more specific note, the Court also reiterates that, while the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in imposing conditions on the right to vote and to stand for election, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate or arbitrary (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113; Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, § 39, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV; and Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 109 (iii), 8 July 2008). "
- "Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not contain a list of “legitimate aims” capable of justifying restrictions on the exercise of the rights it guarantees and does not refer to those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are free to rely on an aim not mentioned in those Articles, provided that it is compatible with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention (see, for example, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR 2006-IV). "
- "The Court reiterates that its competence to verify compliance with domestic law is limited and that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in such matters as assessment of evidence or interpretation of the domestic law. Nevertheless, for the purpose of supervision of the compatibility of an interference with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must scrutinise the relevant domestic procedures and decisions in detail in order to determine whether sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness were afforded to the applicant and whether the relevant decisions were sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 60, ECHR 2004-X). "
- "The Court notes that a finding that a candidate has engaged in unfair or illegal campaigning methods could entail serious consequences for the candidate concerned, in that he or she could be disqualified from running for the election. As the Convention guarantees the effective exercise of individual electoral rights, the Court considers that, in order to prevent arbitrary disqualification of candidates, the relevant domestic procedures should contain sufficient safeguards protecting the candidates from abusive and unsubstantiated allegations of electoral misconduct, and that decisions on disqualification should be based on sound, relevant and sufficient proof of such misconduct (see Orujov, cited above, § 46). "
- "The Court reiterates that considerations of expediency and the necessity for tight time-limits designed to avoid delaying the electoral process, although often justified, may nevertheless not serve as a pretext to undermine the effectiveness of electoral procedures (see, mutatis mutandis, Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 90, 8 April 2010) or to deprive the persons concerned by those procedures of the opportunity to effectively contest any accusations of electoral misconduct made against them (see Orujov, cited above, § 56). "
- "While Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, the Court's case-law establishes that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election. Although those rights are central to democracy and the rule of law, they are not absolute and may be subject to limitations. The Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with: it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52; and more recently, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV; and Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II). "
- "According to the Court's case-law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory, for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention, if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, pp. 35-36, § 72). Moreover, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 39, ECHR 2002-IV). "
- "The Court recalls that this case is primarily about the applicants’ participation in the elections as candidates, i.e. about the passive electoral right. In the context of the “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has stressed that it would be “even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109). "
- "In most of the previous cases under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the Court has had to consider a specific legislative provision or a known administrative measure which has somehow limited the electoral rights of a group of the population or of a specific candidate. In those cases the measure complained of lay within the legal field, and, therefore, could be easily identified and analysed (see, for example, the cases concerning electoral thresholds (Yumak and Sadak, cited above), the right of prisoners to vote (Hirst, cited above), criteria of eligibility of candidates on account of their political affiliation or other status (Ždanoka, cited above; Seyidzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, 3 December 2009), compositions of electoral commissions (The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, ECHR 2008), restrictions on reporting on a particular political movement (Purcell and Others v. Ireland, no. 15404/89, 16 April 1991), or impossibility for nationals living abroad to vote (Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, 15 March 2012). "
- "The Court reiterates that it has interpreted Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as containing certain positive obligations of a procedural character, in particular requiring the existence of a “domestic system for effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights” (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 81 et seq., 8 April 2010; see also the recommendation of the Venice Commission in the Explanatory Report to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Methods concerning creation of an effective system of electoral appeals, paragraph 51 above). The Court refers to its earlier findings under Article 13 in this case that the applicants had at their disposal at least one effective remedy. The Court does not need to define in abstracto the exact relation between the State’s positive obligation under Article 13 and its procedural obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. "
- "There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23 § 52). The State’s margin of appreciation, however, is not unlimited. It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that any such conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Gitonas and Others v. Greece, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p. 233, § 39; Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II; and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52). "
- "Residence requirements have previously found to be justified by the following factors: firstly, the assumption that a non-resident citizen is less directly or less continually concerned with his country’s day-to-day problems and has less knowledge of them; secondly, the fact that it is impracticable for the parliamentary candidates to present the different electoral issues to citizens abroad and that non-resident citizens have no influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; thirdly, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and the fact of being directly affected by the acts of the political bodies so elected; and, fourthly, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country. Even where it may be possible that the applicant has not severed ties with his country of origin and that some of the factors indicated above are therefore inapplicable to this case, the law cannot always take account of every individual case but must lay down a general rule. "
- "Free elections and freedom of expression, and particularly the freedom of political debate, form the foundation of any democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113, and Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §§ 41 and 42, Series A no. 103). The rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere since there are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 51, ECHR 2006-VIII). "
- "It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates. Exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004-V). "
- "This standard of tolerance does not prevent a democratic society from taking steps to protect itself against activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual's capacity to influence the composition of the legislature, does not therefore exclude the possibility of restrictions on electoral rights being imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct has threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations (see, for example, X v. the Netherlands, cited above, and, mutatis mutandis, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Commission decision of 11 October 1979, Decisions and Reports 18, where the Commission declared inadmissible two applications concerning the refusal to allow the applicants, who were the leaders of a proscribed organisation with racist and xenophobic traits, to stand for election). The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned. "
- "The Court points out that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not, like other provisions of the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a restriction must pursue. A wide range of purposes may therefore be compatible with Article 3 (see, for example, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 34, ECHR 2002-II). "
- "Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a principle that is characteristic of an effective political democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (ibid., §§ 46-51). "
- "The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would be merely illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 35). This principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55, ECHR 2008). "
- "[T]he right to vote and to be elected may be accorded to citizens residing abroad. "
- "The presentation of individual candidates or lists of candidates may be made conditional on the collection of a minimum number of signatures; ii. The law should not require collection of the signatures of more than 1% of voters in the constituency concerned; iii. Checking of signatures must be governed by clear rules, particularly concerning deadlines; iv. The checking process must in principle cover all signatures; however, once it has been established beyond doubt that the requisite number of signatures has been collected, the remaining signatures need not be checked; v. Validation of signatures must be completed by the start of the election campaign"
- "Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for parties and candidates alike. This entails a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to: i. the election campaign."
- "State authorities must observe their duty of neutrality. In particular, this concerns: ii. billposting; "
- "[V]oters should always have the possibility of voting in a polling station. Other means of voting are acceptable under the following conditions: iii. postal voting should be allowed only where the postal service is safe and reliable; the right to vote using postal votes may be confined to people who are in hospital or imprisoned or to persons with reduced mobility or to electors residing abroad; fraud and intimidation must not be possible."
- "[E]lectronic voting should be used only if it is safe and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage; the system must be transparent. "
- "[M]obile ballot boxes should only be allowed under strict conditions, avoiding all risks of fraud. "
- "[A]t least two criteria should be used to assess the accuracy of the outcome of the ballot: the number of votes cast and the number of voting slips placed in the ballot box."
- "[V]oting slips must not be tampered with or marked in any way by polling station officials."
- "[P]olling stations must include representatives of a number of parties, and the presence of observers appointed by the candidates must be permitted during voting and counting. "
- "[C]ounting should preferably take place in polling stations. "
- "[C]ounting must be transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and the media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the records."
- " [R]esults must be transmitted to the higher level in an open manner."
- "The violation of secret suffrage should be sanctioned. "
- "Elections must be held at regular intervals; a legislative assembly’s term of office must not exceed five years. "
- "It is desirable that electoral commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus. "
- "The procedure must be simple and devoid of formalism, in particular concerning the admissibility of appeals. "
- "Time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance). "
- "Where the appeal body is a higher electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to rectify or set aside decisions taken by lower electoral commissions. "
- "There must be a minimum age for the right to vote and the right to stand for election; however, attainment of the age of majority, entailing not only rights but also obligations of a civil nature, must at least confer the right to vote. A higher age may be laid down for the right to stand for election but, save where there are specific qualifying ages for certain offices (senator, head of state), this should not be more than 25. "
- "Equality in voting rights requires each voter to be normally entitled to one vote, and to one vote only. Multiple voting, which is still a common irregularity in the new democracies, is obviously prohibited – both if it means a voter votes more than once in the same place and if it enables a voter to vote simultaneously in several different places, such as his or her place of current residence and place of former residence."
- "In some electoral systems, the elector nonetheless has more than one vote. In, for example, a system that allows split voting (voting for candidates chosen from more than one list), the elector may have one vote per seat to be filled; another possibility is when one vote is cast in a small constituency and another in a larger constituency, as is often the case in systems combining single-member constituencies and proportional representation at the national or regional level.In this case, equal voting rights mean that all electors should have the same number of votes. "
- "Public authorities also have certain positive obligations. They must submit lawfully presented candidatures to the citizens’ votes. The presentation of specific candidatures may be prohibited only in exceptional circumstances, where necessitated by a greater public interest. Public authorities must also give the electorate access to lists and candidates standing for election by means, for instance, of appropriate billposting. The information in question must also be available in the languages of national minorities, at least where they make up a certain percentage of the population. Voters’ freedom to form an opinion may also be infringed by individuals, for example when they attempt to buy votes, a practice which the state is obliged to prevent or punish effectively. "