Summary
The state should establish an independent and impartial election body.
Election Parts
Quotes
- Establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management of elections.
- The bodies responsible for organizing the elections shall be independent or neutral and shall have the confidence of all the political actors. Where necessary, appropriate national consultations shall be organized to determine the nature and the structure of the bodies.
- The States party to the Convention commit themselves to: j) to ensure establishment of independent, impartial electoral bodies to organise the conduct of democratic free and fair, authentic and periodical elections in accordance with the national legislation of the country and in line with international commitments of the state.
- As a corollary to the above principle, and recalling that the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and preserving the foundations of a meaningful democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113), the Court finds it particularly important for an agency in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation.
- An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.
- The Court has often underlined the necessity to maintain the political neutrality of those civil servants, judges and other persons in State service who exercise public authority, so as to ensure that all citizens receive equal and fair treatment that is not vitiated by political considerations (see Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, §§ 41 and 46, ECHR 1999-III; Briķe v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47135/99, 29 June 2000; and Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 58, Series A no. 323).
- Having examined the relevant electoral legislation of several Contracting States, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no uniform system for the composition and functioning of electoral administrative bodies in Europe (see paragraphs 58-69 above). There is a diversity of possible choices in this area. Those choices vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State. The Court therefore considers that the Contracting States should indeed be granted a margin of appreciation in the sphere of organising their electoral administrations, as long as the chosen system provides for conditions which ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of their legislature” (see, mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II).
- The Court considers that the lack of clarity of the electoral law as regards national minorities and the lack of sufficient guarantees as to the impartiality of the bodies responsible for examining the applicant’s challenges impaired the very essence of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
- The Court has emphasised that it is important for the authorities in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation (see The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, § 101, 8 July 2008), that the proceedings conducted by them be accompanied by minimum safeguards against arbitrariness and that their decisions are sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Namat Aliyev, cited above, §§ 81-90, and Kovach, cited above, §§ 59-60).
- The Court has emphasised that it is important for the authorities in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation (see The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, § 101, 8 July 2008), that the proceedings conducted by them be accompanied by minimum safeguards against arbitrariness and that their decisions are sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Namat Aliyev, cited above, §§ 81-90, and Kovach, cited above, §§ 59-60).
- The Court has emphasised that it is important for the authorities in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation (see The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, § 101, 8 July 2008), that the proceedings conducted by them be accompanied by minimum safeguards against arbitrariness and that their decisions are sufficiently reasoned (see, mutatis mutandis, Namat Aliyev, cited above, §§ 81-90, and Kovach, cited above, §§ 59-60).
- The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would be merely illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires the finding that this or that candidate has failed to satisfy them to comply with a number of criteria framed to prevent arbitrary decisions. In particular, such a finding must be reached by a body which can provide a minimum of guarantees of its impartiality. Similarly, the discretion enjoyed by the body concerned must not be exorbitantly wide; it must be circumscribed, with sufficient precision, by the provisions of domestic law. Lastly, the procedure for ruling a candidate ineligible must be such as to guarantee a fair and objective decision and prevent any abuse of power on the part of the relevant authority (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 35).
- Establish impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national electoral bodies staffed by qualified personnel, as well as competent legal entities including effective constitutional courts to arbitrate in the event of disputes arising from the conduct of elections.
- SADC Member States shall adhere to the following principles in the conduct of democratic elections:Independence of the Judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions.
- We, Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the States and Governments of Countries using French as a common language, (…) 4 - Undertake the following commitments: (…) B. For the holding of free, fair and transparent elections (...) 8. To ensure that the organization of elections, from the preparatory stage through the election campaign to the counting of votes and the proclamation of results, including, where required, the resolution of any disputes, is conducted in full transparency and is handled by credible bodies whose independence is recognized by all.
- We, Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the States and Governments of Countries using French as a common language, (…) 4 - Undertake the following commitments: (…) B. For the holding of free, fair and transparent elections (...) 8. To ensure that the organization of elections, from the preparatory stage through the election campaign to the counting of votes and the proclamation of results, including, where required, the resolution of any disputes, is conducted in full transparency and is handled by credible bodies whose independence is recognized by all.
- [States should] ensure transparency of the electoral process, particularly in: 8.2.1. the organisation of elections: they should be organised by independent and impartial bodies, which should lead to the general introduction of central electoral commissions, ensuring that adequate resources are made available for the effective registration of voters and efficient organisation of the ballot.
- Strengthen and where necessary establish an appropriate electoral administration and oversight bodies, in our respective countries and provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are free fair and credible.
- Democratic elections should be conducted: e) by impartial…electoral institutions.
- Behind any successful recruitment policy for election officials is the recognition that the appointees must not only be fair-minded and impartial in their dealings with the public and political parties but that they must be perceived to be so by all concerned. Thus, active campaigners or officials of political parties would hardly be considered impartial by the supporters of other political parties contesting an election, and so such individuals should not be appointed as election officials.
- Whatever the structure [of the election authority], legal guarantees should be in place to insulate electoral administration from bias or corruption.
- An independent electoral commission is generally considered to be an essential element in the organization of free and fair multi-party elections.
- In order for the body which is responsible for the governance and control of an electoral system to play its rightful role in nurturing the integrity of the election process, it must not only be independent of government control, it must be perceived to be so by the general public and the political parties.
- Efficiency and impartiality are qualities by which the electoral commission will be judged by the public.
- In a free and fair election, an independent and impartially administered electoral process is essential.
- In some established democracies, national and local government officials, whose neutrality and fairness are generally accepted by the electorate, handle electoral administration. Ordinary courts settle disputes, as they have a tradition of fairness and neutrality and generally enjoy the confidence of the electorate. In emerging democracies, there has been an increasing trend to establish independent EMBs. This is seen as an important step in building a tradition of independence and impartiality, as well as building the confidence of the electorate and political parties in the electoral process; however, since there is yet no internally-recognized standard in this respect, the term “independent EMB”...means an autonomous and impartial EMB.
- In the interest of promoting and entrenching pluralism, multi-party democracy and the integrity of the electoral process, the complete independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission in dealing with all political parties should be reaffirmed in the constitution.
- Every EMB is expected to manage elections impartially. Irrespective of the model under which the EMB exists, its source of accountability, management control or funding, it should treat all election participants equally, fairly and even-handedly, without giving advantage to any political tendency or interest group...52. It is important that EMBs be seen to be impartial by the general public. The best way to achieve this is through transparent actions backed by vigorous marketing and public relations efforts.
- In addition, States should take the necessary policy and institutional steps to ensure the progressive achievement and consolidation of democratic goals, including through the establishment of a neutral, impartial or balanced mechanism for the management of elections.
- The government and judicial bodies directly or indirectly involved in the electoral process, and the electoral commissions on all levels, must be independent and their work open to scrutiny.
- The functioning of an electoral body should not be subject to the direction of any other person, authority or political party; it must function without political favour or bias. The body in charge of administering or supervising an election must be able to operate free of interference, simply because any allegation of manipulation, perception of bias, or alleged interference, will have a direct impact, not only on the credibility of the body in charge, but on the entire process. There are many instances in which the perceived influence of a political party or parties of the electoral machinery has severely detracted form the validity of election results. Particularly in developing and emerging democracies, there is a much greater degree of vulnerability to allegations of undue influence and bias, thereby making the entire process more susceptible to credibility judgments, which then inevitably result in a limited acceptance of election results and of the process as a whole.
- Regardless of how formed and the degree of partisanship involved, election administration bodies should operate in an independent, collegial, and impartial manner. Once formed, an election administration body must serve the interests of all citizens and electoral participants. No election administration body should act in a partisan manner or exhibit partiality in the performance of its duties.
- Provisions of the law should ensure that an objective, unbiased, independent and effective administrative structure is in place. This entails careful attention to provisions for appointment, remuneration, duties, powers, qualifications and reporting structure of electoral staff. At all levels, staff must be insulated from bias and political pressure. A single line of ultimate authority should be established. These concerns remain important regardless of the type of administration selected.
- The independence of the election administration body is further guaranteed by a transparent, sufficient and independent budget provided from government resources.
- The overall credibility of an electoral process is substantially dependent on all relevant groups (including political parties, government, civil society and the media) being aware of and participating in the debate surrounding the formation of the electoral structure and processes. An informed debate in these groups should also take place regarding the functioning of the EMBs. In this respect the value of constant consultation, communication and cooperation among EMBs, the political parties and the institutions of society cannot be over-emphasized
- The EMB must be impartial and competent, and it must be perceived to be both by the electoral contestants and the public.
- Impartial election administration is critical for democratic elections. Further, impartiality in election administration must be accompanied by the appearance of fairness. Regardless of how an election administration is structured, it is important that it not only function in an impartial manner but also be perceived by the electorate as doing so.
- Political parties must be equally represented on electoral commissions or must be able to observe the work of the impartial body. Equality may be construed strictly or on a proportional basis (see point I.2.3.b).
- An electoral body must...act with impartiality and a maximum of transparency, consulting in a meaningful way with interested parties, before decisions are taken on important matters and being prepared to give reasons for such decisions.
- The constitutional and legal framework should: provide for the establishment of an independent and impartial electoral management body.
- An impartial body must be in charge of applying electoral law.
- The commission’s independence can be strengthened by appointing commission members for a fixed (and sufficiently long) time period and by prohibiting their dismissal without reasonable grounds.
- It is regarded as helpful if at least some of the commission members are appointed by non-political institutions that are perceived as being neutral.
- If some or all commission members are appointed by the parliament or by political parties, an adequate balance between pro-government and opposition parties has to be achieved.
- To avoid the risk of governmental interference in the commission’s work, as a rule the number of commission members nominated and appointed by the executive government should, if at all, be very low.
- It is important that not all commission members are appointed by the same institution.
- The provision for regular or expanded membership of electoral commissions to include party representatives is often regarded as an effective system to guarantee checks and balances of the electoral process. The underlying idea is that one party watches the other. Progovernment and opposition parties are represented in the electoral commission and can control each other. Closely related to the nomination of party representatives to electoral commissions, however, is the risk of the over-politicisation of the commission’s work. In such cases, the commission’s members act in the interest of their parties rather than in the interest of the electorate.
- In order to guarantee the independence of the election commission it is usually preferable to respect common incompatibilities in the commission members. Persons who could be involved in an inherent conflict of interests with the requirement for impartiality should not be allowed to be appointed to electoral commissions.
- Qualified voting requirements can also be abused to obstruct the decision making process, particularly under the condition of a strongly politicised electoral administration.
- An impartial body must be in charge of organising the referendum.
- Where there is no longstanding tradition of administrative authorities’ impartiality in electoral matters, independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up at all levels, from the national level to polling station level.
- Only transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process, from the pre-election period to the end of the processing of results.
- Other electoral commissions operating at regional or constituency level should have a similar composition to that of the central electoral commission. Constituency commissions play an important role in uninominal voting systems because they determine the winner in general elections. Regional commissions also play a major role in relaying the results to the central electoral commission.
- The composition of the central electoral commission is certainly important, but no more so than its mode of operation. The commission’s rules of procedure must be clear, because commission chairpersons have a tendency to let members speak, which the latter are quick to exploit. The rules of procedure should provide for an agenda and a limited amount of speaking time for each member – e.g. a quarter of an hour; otherwise endless discussions are liable to obscure the main business of the day.
- Broadly speaking, bodies that appoint members to electoral commissions should not be free to recall them, as it casts doubt on their independence. Discretionary recall is unacceptable, but recall for disciplinary reasons is permissible - provided that the grounds for this are clearly and restrictively specified in law (vague references to “acts discrediting the commission”, for example, are not sufficient).
- As a general rule, the commission should consist of: - a judge or law officer: where a judicial body is responsible for administering the elections, its independence must be ensured through transparent proceedings. Judicial appointees should not come under the authority of those standing for office; - representatives of parties already represented in parliament or which have won more than a certain percentage of the vote. Political parties should be represented equally in the central electoral commission; “equally” may be interpreted strictly or proportionally, that is to say, taking or not taking account of the parties’ relative electoral strengths. Moreover, party delegates should be qualified in electoral matters and should be prohibited from campaigning. In addition, the electoral commission may include: - representatives of national minorities; their presence is desirable if the national minority is of a certain importance in the territory concerned; - a representative of the Ministry of the Interior. However, for reasons connected with the history of the country concerned, it may not always be appropriate to have a representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the commission.
- This is why independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up from the national level to polling station level to ensure that elections are properly conducted, or at least remove serious suspicions of irregularity.
- To ensure proper administration of the EDR process, the election administration at both the central and local levels should be free from any political interference and guided by the fair implementation of laws. Irrespective of the composition of the election administration body, its independence should be expressed in clear and transparent proceedings.
- It [the central electoral commission] should include: i. at least one member of the judiciary; ii. representatives of parties already in parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters. It may include: iii. a representative of the Ministry of the Interior; iv. representatives of national minorities.
- The legal protection afforded to the independence and status of an electoral body is maximised where it is provided for in a country’s Constitution, although some countries make provision for this and other key features of electoral practice in legislation.
- Organisation of the referendum by an impartial body d. It should include: i. at least one member of the judiciary or other independent legal expert; ii. representatives of parties already in Parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters. It may include: iii. a representative of the Ministry of the Interior; iv. representatives of national minorities.
- The importance and practical usefulness of an…impartial authority charged with the administration of all aspects of the electoral process are increasingly evident.
- Election administrators should: (i) Act in a strictly neutral and unbiased manner in every matter concerning a political party, candidate, voter, or member of the press or media. (ii) Do nothing that could indicate, or be seen as indicating, partisan support for a candidate, political party, political actor or political tendency. (iii) Conduct themselves, at all times, in an irreproachable manner, exercise sound judgment, and observe the highest levels of personal discretion. (iv) Disclose any relationship that could lead to a conflict of interest with their duties as election administrators. (v) Not accept any gift or favor from a political party, organization, or person involved in the lection process. (vi) Reject any improper influences, and, except as provided by law or custom, refrain from accepting directions relating to the performance of their tasks. (vii) Not participate in any unauthorized activity, including any private activity, that could lead to an actual or perceived conflict of interest wit their duties as election administrators. (viii) Not participate in any activity, including any private activity, that could lead to a perception of sympathy for a particular candidate, political party, political actor, or political tendency. (ix) Not express a view of any subject that is likely to be a political issue in the election. (x) Not communicate with any voter on a matter of partisan significance. (xi) Not wear, carry or display any obviously partisan party symbols or colours.
- The experience of Commonwealth observer groups strongly suggests that the independence of an electoral commission can best be achieved in a multi-party system through the formal constitutional recognition of the commission’s role to protect the interest of opposition parties on an impartial basis.
- If a judicial body is charged with administering the elections, its independence from executive authorities and political forces must be ensured, including through transparent proceedings. Judicial appointees should be immune from the authority of those standing for office.
- An electoral body, however styled…must…act with impartiality.
- The administration of the election has been fair and impartial as between all the political parties taking part.
- A national election administration, such as a central election commission or equivalent body, is usually responsible for administering an election. Occasionally, the judiciary may oversee the election process. Whichever body is constituted to administer a particular election, its work should be collegial, non-partisan, transparent, and independent from the authorities and other political influences.
- The independence of a central election commission is enhanced if it is composed or respected and suitably qualified individuals and nominated by a balance of interests. It should be able to implement the election legislation and regulations without interference, intimidation, or impediments to its duty. The administering body could also be made up of balance of representatives nominated by political parties. The balance of party representatives can serve as a check on potential misadministration or abuse of office, particularly if parties are represented at all levels of the election administration. If political-party nominees constitute election commissions, they should be prohibited from campaigning and should be able to act independently without fear of retribution or recall.
- An electoral commission ought to be an independent body established under the Constitution. It was shown earlier that its very establishment, under the Constitution of the country concerned, lays the foundations for its independence. The term ‘independence’ in this context means that the electoral commission concerned is not subject to the control of the government of the day or any political party or any other body, and acts impartially and professionally towards all political parties.
- The functioning of the EMB should not be subject to the direction of any other person, authority or political party. It must function without political favouritism or bias. The EMB must be able to operate free of interference, simply because any allegation of manipulation, perception of bias or alleged interference will have a direct impact not only on the credibility of the body in charge but on the entire election process.
- An impartial body must be in charge of applying electoral law.
- The EMB should work transparently, efficiently and professionally and will be expected to administer the electoral process so that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with national laws and international standards for elections.
- The officials are acting independently.
- An independent electoral authority should be in place mandated to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted in accordance with the established laws which are compatible with international human rights law. Whichever body is constituted or assigned to administer the elections, its work should be independent, impartial, and transparent. The administering body should be independent from political motivated manipulation.
- The legal framework should clearly define the duties and functions of the EMB. These must particularly include the following: Ensuring that election officials and staff responsible for the administration of the election are well trained and act impartially and independently of any political interest.
- Whether an election administration is composed of multi-party representatives or non-political representatives—whether it is ad hoc or permanent – there is often some contradiction between the ideal of an independent body and the reality that an election administration will never be entirely free of some government influence. The election administration should be structured to protect it from government influence through: legal guarantees of independence…; budgetary independence…; the appointing body (members…may be nominated by the executive, Parliament, judiciary, or political parties in the process. The official appointing body, whether it be the executive, Parliament or judiciary, should just confirm that the nominations are in line with the law, but should not have the right to hand pick an election commission through repeatedly rejecting nominations. The important point is that the source of the nominations comes from a balance of interests); terms of appointment (the independence of the election commission is best guaranteed when an individual is appointed for some reasonable length of time, as they do not have to depend on each government for reappointment, the duration of appointment for the election administration is ideally longer than the term of office of the appointee).
- The overall credibility of an electoral process is substantially dependent on all relevant groups, from government to civil society, participating in the formation and functioning of electoral structures and processes. In this respect, the value of constant consultation, communication and co-operation among the electoral administration, the political parties and the institutions of society cannot be over emphasized. In the formulation of the legislative framework of an electoral administration, this aspect should receive particular attention.
- The administration of democratic elections requires that election commissions/bodies are independent and impartial.