Summary
Every citizen has the right to be elected.
Obligations
Issues
Criteria
- Every citizen had the right to be elected, subject only to reasonable restrictions
- The vote-counting process was transparent and observable
- Candidates and their representatives were able to observe polling and counting as means of protecting their right to be elected
- The state took proactive measures to promote voting by the broadest pool of eligible voters and ensure votes cast were counted
- The vote counting and tabulation process did not discriminate against anyone on the basis of prohibited grounds
- Vote counting and tabulation processes protected the right to be elected
Quotes
- The observance of the principle of universal suffrage means: a) every citizen, upon coming up to the age fixed by the Constitution, laws, has the right to elect and to be elected to the bodies of state power, to local self-governments, other bodies of people’s (national) representation, to elective posts on the conditions and in line with procedures stipulated by the Constitution and laws.
- Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.
- In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service.
- State Parties shall take all appropriate policy, legislative and other measures to ensure this right (to participate in political and public life), on the basis of equality, including through: (…) e) Repealing or amending laws that on the basis of disability restrict the right of persons with disabilities to vote, stand for or remain in public office.
- Every citizen should have equal legal possibilities to propose him/herself as a candidate in elections.
- Every citizen has the right: 3. To stand for election... 4. To the opportunity to gain access, on an equal footing with others, to public office in his country in accordance with the principle of equality of opportunity.
- Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- In applying the provisions of this Convention, Governments shall: Establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them.
- State Parties shall take all appropriate policy, legislative and other measures to ensure this right (to participate in political and public life), on the basis of equality, including through: (…) e) Repealing or amending laws that on the basis of disability restrict the right of persons with disabilities to vote, stand for or remain in public office.
- To vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the voter.
- Everyone shall have the right and opportunity and in the state of which he is a citizen (b) to vote and to be elected at elections held on the basis of universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot, that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters.
- States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure women, on equal terms with men, the right: (a) to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; (c) to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.
- Protecting the right of persons with disabilities to vote by secret ballot in elections and public referendums without intimidation, and to stand for elections, to effectively hold office and perform all public functions at all levels of government, facilitating the use of assistive and new technologies where appropriate;
- The High Contracting Parties agree that the right to vote and to be elected at national office shall not be denies or abridged by reason of sex.
- Member States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that women have equal rights with men to vote and be voted for in elections, to participate in the formulation of government policies and the implementation thereof and to hold public offices and perform public functions at all levels of governance.
- Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to participate in public affairs of their State of origin and to vote and to be elected at elections of that State, in accordance with its legislation.
- Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.
- State Parties shall implement this Charter in accordance with the following principles: 7. Effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance of public affairs.
- States Parties shall take specific positive action to promote participative governance and the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action, enabling national legislation and other measures to ensure that: b) women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes.
- The Court reiterates that it has interpreted Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as containing certain positive obligations of a procedural character, in particular requiring the existence of a “domestic system for effective examination of individual complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights” (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 81 et seq., 8 April 2010; see also the recommendation of the Venice Commission in the Explanatory Report to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Methods concerning creation of an effective system of electoral appeals, paragraph 51 above). The Court refers to its earlier findings under Article 13 in this case that the applicants had at their disposal at least one effective remedy. The Court does not need to define in abstracto the exact relation between the State’s positive obligation under Article 13 and its procedural obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
- Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the rights of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs…. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.
- In that connection, the Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the Convention requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not just theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, for example, Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15-16, § 33; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 18-19, § 33; and Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic system, would be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions.
- The Court recalls that this case is primarily about the applicants’ participation in the elections as candidates, i.e. about the passive electoral right. In the context of the “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has stressed that it would be “even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109).
- The Court reiterates that, under its case-law, the notion of “individual rights” (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 25, ECHR 2004-V, and Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV) or “subjective rights” (see Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 54, ECHR 2004-X) to stand for election under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have mostly been confined to physical persons. However, it has been recently accepted that, when electoral legislation or the measures taken by national authorities restrict individual candidates’ right to stand for election through a party list, the relevant party, as a corporate entity, could claim to be a victim under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 independently of its candidates (see Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, nos. 55066/00 and 55638/00, §§ 53-67, 11 January 2007.).
- The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 differs from other rights guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that this provision also implies individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113, and Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV).
- The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3) implies subjective rights to vote and to stand for election. As important as those rights are, they are not, however, absolute. Since Article 3 (P1-3) recognises them without setting them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for ""implied limitations"" (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, para. 52). In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3 (P1-3). They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 (P1) have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (ibid.).
- The Court has had frequent occasion to highlight the importance of democratic principles underlying the interpretation and application of the Convention (see, among other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, pp. 21-22, § 45), and it would take this opportunity to emphasise that the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (see also the importance of these rights as recognised internationally in “Relevant international materials”, paragraphs 26-39 above).
- Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 appears at first sight to differ from the other rights guaranteed in the Convention and Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113). The Court has consistently highlighted the importance of the democratic principles underlying the interpretation and application of the Convention and has emphasised that the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (ibid., § 47; see also Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 58, ECHR 2005-IX).
- Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 appears at first sight to differ from the other rights guaranteed in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work to Article 3 of the Protocol and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see, among many other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113; Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 56-57, ECHR 2005-IX; and, more recently, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV). Furthermore, the Court has considered that this Article guarantees the individual’s right to stand for election and, once elected, to sit as a member of parliament (see Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 50, ECHR 2006-VIII).
- As to the nature of the rights thus enshrined in Article 3 (P1-3), the view taken by the Commission has evolved. From the idea of an "institutional" right to the holding of free elections (decision of 18 September 1961 on the admissibility of application no. 1028/61, X v. Belgium, Yearbook of the Convention, vol. 4, p. 338) the Commission has moved to the concept of "universal suffrage" (see particularly the decision of 6 October 1967 on the admissibility of application no. 2728/66, X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 338) and then, as a consequence, to the concept of subjective rights of participation - the "right to vote" and the "right to stand for election to the legislature" (see in particular the decision of 30 May 1975 on the admissibility of applications nos. 6745-6746/76, W, X, Y and Z v. Belgium, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 244).
- As regards the method of appointing the ""legislature"", Article 3 (P1-3) provides only for "free" elections "at reasonable intervals", "by secret ballot" and "under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people". Subject to that, it does not create any "obligation to introduce a specific system" (""Travaux Préparatoires"", vol. VII, pp. 130, 202 and 210, and vol. VIII, p. 14) such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots. Here too the Court recognises that the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation, given that their legislation on the matter varies from place to place and from time to time. Electoral systems seek to fulfil objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand, to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. In these circumstances the phrase "conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature" implies essentially - apart from freedom of expression (already protected under Article 10 of the Convention) (art. 10) - the principle of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to stand for election. It does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate "wasted votes". For the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), any electoral system must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned; features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may accordingly be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the ""free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature"".
- The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 72, 8 April 2010), including the manner of review of the outcome of elections and invalidation of election results (see Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55 et seq., ECHR 2008-...).
- The object and purpose of the Convention, which is an instrument for the protection of human rights, requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 33, Reports 1998-I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III; and Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, § 56, ECHR 2006-VIII). The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would only be illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires that the eligibility procedure contain sufficient safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions (see Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 35, ECHR 2002-II). Although originally stated in connection with the conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, § 72, 8 April 2010), including the manner of review of the outcome of elections and invalidation of election results (see Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, § 55 et seq., ECHR 2008-...).
- Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 appears at first sight to differ from the other rights guaranteed in the Convention and Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, the Court has established that it guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113). The Court has consistently highlighted the importance of the democratic principles underlying the interpretation and application of the Convention and has emphasised that the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (ibid., § 47; see also Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 58, ECHR 2005-IX).
- The right to stand as a candidate in an election, which is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and is inherent in the concept of a truly democratic regime, would be merely illusory if one could be arbitrarily deprived of it at any moment. Consequently, while it is true that States have a wide margin of appreciation when establishing eligibility conditions in the abstract, the principle that rights must be effective requires the finding that this or that candidate has failed to satisfy them to comply with a number of criteria framed to prevent arbitrary decisions. In particular, such a finding must be reached by a body which can provide a minimum of guarantees of its impartiality. Similarly, the discretion enjoyed by the body concerned must not be exorbitantly wide; it must be circumscribed, with sufficient precision, by the provisions of domestic law. Lastly, the procedure for ruling a candidate ineligible must be such as to guarantee a fair and objective decision and prevent any abuse of power on the part of the relevant authority (see Podkolzina, cited above, § 35).
- Persons with disabilities have the right to be effectively protected and to positively engage. The law itself shall guarantee the substantive equality of all those within a given jurisdiction. Thus, the recognition that all persons with disabilities are equal under the law means that there should be no laws that allow for specific denial, restriction or limitation of the rights of persons with disabilities, and that disability should be mainstreamed in all legislation and policies.
- Persons with disabilities have the right to be effectively protected and to positively engage. The law itself shall guarantee the substantive equality of all those within a given jurisdiction. Thus, the recognition that all persons with disabilities are equal under the law means that there should be no laws that allow for specific denial, restriction or limitation of the rights of persons with disabilities, and that disability should be mainstreamed in all legislation and policies.
- The Court considers that, irrespective of whether or not the request was made outside the legal time frame for the registration of candidacies submitted by political parties, the decision of IFE not to accept the alleged victim’s request constituted, for the effects of this Court’s competence, an act enforcing the law, since this negative was based, first, on the provisions of Article 177 of the COFIPE concerning the legal time frames for the registration of candidacies and, second, on the provisions of Article 175 of COFIPE, concerning candidacies by means of political parties, and this authority had indicated the legal impossibility of accepting Mr. Castañeda Gutman’s request. This decision, based on the constitutional and legal provisions that regulate the matter, issued by the competent administrative authority hat ruled on the legal issue filed before it, with the specific and concrete effect of not allowing the registration of the candidacy, was the act enforcing the law, and was even considered as such by the domestic courts.
- In this regard, the Committee recalls its General Comment on article 25, according to which the exercise of the rights protected by article 25 may not be suspended or excluded except on grounds which are established by law and which are objective and reasonable. The Committee notes that article 68, part 6, of the Electoral Code, gives a right to electoral commissions to refuse registering a candidate when he or she submits data that does not “correspond to reality”, including biographic data and information on income and property.
- Lastly, the Court considers that both systems, one built on the exclusive basis of political parties, and the other that also allows independent candidacies can be compatible with the Convention and, therefore, the decision on which system to choose is subject to the political decision made by the State, in accordance with its constitutional norms. The Court is aware that there is a profound crisis as regards the political parties, the legislatures and those who conduct public affairs in the region, which calls for a thorough and thoughtful debate on political participation and representation, transparency, and the rapprochement of the institutions to the people, in brief, on strengthening and improving democracy. Civil society and the State have the fundamental responsibility, which cannot be waived, to carry out this discussion and make proposals to reverse the situation. In this regard, the States must assess the measures that will strengthen political rights and democracy according to their particular historical and political evolution, and independent candidacies may be one among many of these mechanisms.
- The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a characteristic principle of an effective political democracy and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has held that it also implies individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election (ibid., § 51). It has also held that the standards to be applied for establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must be considered to be less stringent than those applied under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR 2006-IV).
- In most of the previous cases under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the Court has had to consider a specific legislative provision or a known administrative measure which has somehow limited the electoral rights of a group of the population or of a specific candidate. In those cases the measure complained of lay within the legal field, and, therefore, could be easily identified and analysed (see, for example, the cases concerning electoral thresholds (Yumak and Sadak, cited above), the right of prisoners to vote (Hirst, cited above), criteria of eligibility of candidates on account of their political affiliation or other status (Ždanoka, cited above; Seyidzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, 3 December 2009), compositions of electoral commissions (The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, ECHR 2008), restrictions on reporting on a particular political movement (Purcell and Others v. Ireland, no. 15404/89, 16 April 1991), or impossibility for nationals living abroad to vote (Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, 15 March 2012).
- Measures that should be identified, implemented and monitored for effectiveness include, under article 7, paragraph (a), those designed to: (c) Ensure that barriers to equality are overcome, including those resulting from illiteracy, language, poverty and impediments to women's freedom of movement; (d) Assist women experiencing such disadvantages to exercise their right to vote and to be elected.
- In this regard, the Committee notes that article 25 of the Covenant secures to every citizen the right and the opportunity to be elected at genuine periodic elections without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2, paragraph 1, including political opinion.
- The applicant was entitled under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to stand for election in fair and democratic conditions, regardless of whether ultimately he won or lost. In the present case, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 requires the Court not to ascertain merely that the election outcome as such was not prejudiced, but to verify that the applicant's individual right to stand for election was not deprived of its effectiveness and that its essence had not been impaired.
- The Court observes that, in comparative electoral law, the regulation of the right to be elected, as regards the registration of the candidacies, may be executed in two ways: by the system of registration of candidates exclusively by the political parties, or by the system of registration of candidacies by the political parties, together with the possibility of registering independent candidacies. In the region, there is a certain balance between the States that have establishes the system of registration exclusively by parties and those that also allow independent candidacies.
- Neither of the two systems: exclusive nomination by political parties or the one that allows independent candidacies is, in itself, more or less restrictive than the other in terms of regulating the right to be elected embodied in Article 23 of the Convention. The Court considers that it is not possible to make an abstract assessment of whether the system that allows independent candidacies is a less restrictive alternative for regulating the right to be elected than the other that does not allow them. This will depend on diverse circumstances, especially on how the abovementioned aspects of the independent candidacies are regulated or on the regulation of the candidacies presented by parties.
- Independent candidacies can be regulated to facilitate and expand access to the right to be elected, but at times the requirements for registering independent candidacies can be greater than those established for the nomination of a candidate by a political party. The mere fact that independent candidacies are allowed does not mean that this is the least restrictive way to regulate the right to be elected. The essential point is that whichever of the two systems is chosen, it should make accessible and guarantee the right and the opportunity to be elected established in the Convention, under equal conditions.
- The Court cannot but acknowledge the seriousness of the claims made by the applicant before the domestic authorities. In particular, he complained of unlawful interference in the election process by local executive authorities, undue influence on voter choice, several instances of ballot-box stuffing, harassment of observers, irregularities in electoral rolls and obvious discrepancies in PEC protocols showing a possible failure to account for as many as thousands of “unused” blank ballots. The Court considers that these types of irregularities, if duly confirmed to have taken place, were indeed potentially capable of thwarting the democratic nature of the elections.
- This positive obligation consists in designing a system that allows representatives to be elected to conduct public affairs. Indeed, for political rights to be exercised, the law must establish regulations that go beyond those related to certain State limitations to restrict those rights, established in Article 23(2). The States must organize their electoral systems and establish a complex number of conditions and formalities to make it possible to exercise the right to vote and to be elected.
- Regarding whether the measure was adapted to achieving the legitimate objective sought, based on the above the Court finds that, in the instant case, the exclusivity of nomination by political parties to elected office at the federal level is an appropriate measure to produce the legitimate result sought of organizing the electoral processes efficiently in order to hold genuine periodic elections, by universal and equal suffrage and by secret vote that guarantee the free expression of the will of the voters, as established by the American Convention.
- Political participation by exercising the right to be elected supposes that citizens can postulate themselves as candidates in conditions of equality and that they can occupy public office subject to election if they are able to achieve the necessary number of votes.
- In the sphere of political rights the guarantee obligation is especially relevant and is implemented, among other mechanisms, by the establishment of the organizational and institutional aspects of the electoral processes, and by the enactment of norms and the adoption of different types of measures to implement the rights and opportunities recognized in Article 23 of the Convention. In the absence of this action by the State, the right to vote and to be elected could simply not be exercised. The political and other rights established in the Convention, such as the right to judicial protection, are rights that “cannot be merely by virtue of the provisions that embody them, because they are, by their very nature, ineffectual without a detailed normative regulation, and even without a complex institutional, economic and human apparatus that endows them with the effectiveness they claim, as rights under the Convention[…]; if there were no electoral codes or law, electors’ lists, political parties, propaganda media and mobilization, polling stations, electoral boards, dates and times for exercising the vote, the right could simply not be exercised, due to its very nature; similarly, the right to judicial protection cannot be exercised unless there are courts that grant this right, and procedural norms that discipline it and make it possible.
- The Inter-American system also does not impose a specific electoral system or a specific means of exercising the rights to vote and to be elected. The American Convention establishes general guidelines that determine a minimum content of political rights and allows the States to regulate those rights, within the parameters established in the Convention, according to their historical, political, social and cultural needs, which may vary from one country to another and even within one country, at different historical moments.
- The Court finds it necessary to indicate that, in general, international law does not impose a specific electoral system or a specific means of exercising the rights to vote and to be elected. This is clear from the norms that regulate political rights in both the universal and the regional sphere, and from the authorized interpretations made by their organs of application.
- The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). Given that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are free to rely on an aim not contained in such a list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case (see Ždanoka, cited above). Nevertheless, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions to which the right to vote and the right to stand for election are made subject do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they meet the requirements of lawfulness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 162, ECHR 2010, and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52).
- In support of democracy and the democratic process We will: promote political representation, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment.
- SADC Member States shall adhere to the following principles in the conduct of democratic elections: Equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for.
- Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- At the beginning of the new century and millennium, we reaffirm our commitment to the promotion of democracy and its core values in our respective countries. In particular, we undertake to work with renewed determination to enforce the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office.
- Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.
- Tak[e] all necessary measures to eliminate laws, regulations and practices that discriminate, directly or indirectly, against citizens in their right to participate in public affairs on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, or on the basis of disability.
- [Consider] signing and ratifying or acceding to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other core international human rights treaties.
- Tak[e] proactive measures to eliminate all barriers in law and in practice that prevent or hinder citizens, in particular women, persons belonging to marginalized groups or minorities, persons with disabilities and persons in vulnerable situations, from participating fully in effectively in political and public affairs, including, inter alia, reviewing and repealing measures that unreasonably restrict the right to participate in public affairs, and considering adopting, on the basis of reliable data on participation, temporary special measure, including legislative acts, aimed at increasing the participation of underrepresented groups in all aspects of political and public life;
- To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the participating states will: (7.5) respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination.
- There must be a minimum age for the right to vote and the right to stand for election; however, attainment of the age of majority, entailing not only rights but also obligations of a civil nature, must at least confer the right to vote. A higher age may be laid down for the right to stand for election but, save where there are specific qualifying ages for certain offices (senator, head of state), this should not be more than 25.
- As with the right to vote, the right to stand for elections is universal, and can not be limited for reasons of e.g. race, gender, language, religion, ethnic origin, political affiliation, or economic status. Internationally accepted restrictions may include a minimum age that is higher than the voting age, citizenship and a residency requirement for a certain period of time before elections. Furthermore, the obligation to collect a specific number of signatures or to pay a small deposit are considered as being generally compatible with the universal right to stand for elections. There might also be provisions for clauses suspending political rights (lawful detention, mental incapacity etc.).
- Every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, including the right to stand for elected office, to participate in the formulation of policies affecting their welfare, and to have equal access to all levels of public service and employment in public functions, including serving in the police and military, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
- The nomination process has been a vulnerable stage in election preparation. Prospective candidates have been prevented from submitting their nomination papers due to violence, procedural deficiencies and inadequate role of the courts...it is therefore recommended that technical requirements/rules should be kept to the absolute minimum.
- Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country and shall have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The criteria for participation in government shall be determined in accordance with national constitutions and laws and shall not be inconsistent with the State's international obligations.
- International human rights law explicitly proclaims the right of citizens to equal access to public office.
- All candidates who wish to run should be able to do so.
- National minorities are recognized to have an equal right to participation in public affairs, including through being effectively represented in public offices. This includes the rights to vote, stand for election, participate in public affairs, and form political parties without discrimination.
- The right to vote and to be voted for should be accepted as a birth right in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
- The right to be elected does not mean that all citizens would have a subjective right to become a member of an elected body. Rather it means that all citizens that qualify under the provisions of the law should have not only the right but also the opportunity to stand as a candidate.
- Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for parties and candidates alike. This entails a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to: i. the election campaign.
- Universal suffrage means in principle that all human beings have the right to vote and to stand for election. This right may, however, and indeed should, be subject to certain conditions.